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Transitive Counterparty Risk  
and Financial Contracts 
Manuel A. Utset† 
INTRODUCTION 
Before the Great Recession of 2007–2009 (the Great 
Recession), Congress, regulators, and many commentators had 
assumed (often implicitly) that the best way to prevent financial 
crises and contagion was to ensure that each financial 
institution subject to regulatory oversight—primarily depository 
institutions, such as commercial banks—remained financially 
sound. To accomplish this, Congress required depository 
institutions insured by the FDIC to retain sufficient amounts of 
capital (to avoid bank runs and insolvency) and to subject 
themselves to active (often on-site) oversight by the FDIC.  
The Great Recession exposed a number of flaws with 
extant financial regulations. First, many financial institutions 
acted just like banks but escaped banking regulation by not 
accepting deposits subject to FDIC insurance. Many of these 
“shadow banks,” as well as regulated banks (collectively, 
“financial institutions”), failed or received bailout funds from the 
government. This occurred not because they became insolvent 
but because they suffered from liquidity problems—they were 
unable to continue raising capital to finance their ongoing 
operations, or they were forced to pay much higher returns to 
entice investors to make investments. Second, these failing 
financial institutions were parties to thousands or, in some 
cases, millions of financial contracts,1 many of which were highly 
complex and not well understood by regulators, rating agencies, 
                                                
 † William & Catherine VanDercreek Professor, Florida State University 
College of Law. I would like to thank the participants at the Graduate Seminar 
Colloquium, Department of Mathematics, Financial Mathematics Group, Florida State 
University, for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
 1 For example, when Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, it had nearly 
one million open derivatives contracts, a large number of them with other financial 
institutions. See Henry A. Barkhausen, Derivatives in Bankruptcy: Some Lessons from 
Lehman Brothers, J. STRUCTURED FIN., Winter 2010, at 7, 7. 
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and even the parties themselves in some cases.2 Third, regulators, 
financial institutions, and market participants did not have 
available sufficiently robust mechanisms to keep track of financial 
contracts and the aggregate, system-wide risks they created.  
As financial regulators continue to adopt rules under 
the Dodd-Frank Act, they will have to answer a number of 
foundational questions. What does it mean for a financial 
institution to be interconnected to another, or two other, or n 
other institutions? How can regulators distinguish between 
socially beneficial and socially harmful interconnections? Is it 
possible for regulators to identify growing, system-wide risks, 
and to devise and implement solutions in a timely fashion? What 
does it mean for two or more financial contracts to be 
interconnected? What are the risks of having n interconnected 
contracts involving k institutions (and other types of 
counterparties)? What type of information about interconnected 
financial institutions and interconnected financial contracts 
must parties possess to make optimal contracting and risk 
allocation decisions? What type of information must regulators 
possess to engage in real-time oversight of the financial system?  
Almost three years into the Act, regulators have 
adopted only a relatively small number of the rules dealing 
with these foundational questions. This delay in fleshing out 
Dodd-Frank is due in part to political factors and regulatory 
overload. But it is also due to a deeper and more basic 
theoretical issue: we still lack an adequate account of an 
increasingly common type of financial transaction, which I will 
refer to as “n-contracts-transactions.” In these transactions, 
multiple parties are bound together, often indirectly and 
without privity of contract or knowledge of the identities of the 
other parties in the n – 1 contracts that comprise the one, 
global transaction. These transactions are not innocuous. They 
can lead to the spillover of counterparty risks among parties 
that are not in privity of contract. They are also not well 
understood, notwithstanding their ubiquity.  
More generally, transitive-risk contracts involve three 
or more interconnected parties, such as when A enters into a 
contract with B, and B enters into a contract with C. Although 
A and C are not in contractual privity, the transactional risks 
                                                
 2 See COUNTERPARTY RISK MGMT. POLICY GRP. III, CONTAINING SYSTEMIC 
RISK: THE ROAD TO REFORM 4 (2008), available at http://www.crmpolicygroup.org/ 
docs/CRMPG-III.pdf (describing the complexity faced by financial institutions in the 
day-to-day risk management of portfolios of complex securities).  
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of the first contract may spill over to C, and those of the second 
contract may spill over to A. I will refer to this sort of 
externality as “transitive counterparty risk.” On the other 
hand, if A, B, and C were parties to a single contract, A and C 
could protect themselves by including the necessary provisions 
in the contract. This article’s theory of transitive-risk contracts 
will offer an account of the role of n-contracts-transactions in 
transferring transitive counterparty risk. 
Transitive-risk contracts are common in financial 
settings. The relationship between bank depositors and bank 
borrowers involves transitive-risk contracts. Bank depositors are 
also in a transitive-risk relationship with each other, as are 
lenders in repo transactions. Transitive-risk contracts are also 
present in securitizations and more general transactions 
involving derivatives. It turns out that the most basic 
transaction involving financial institutions—that in which they 
act as financial intermediaries—is the prototypical transitive-
risk contract. 
If we are to fully understand what caused the Great 
Recession and how to avoid a recurrence, we must first answer 
two basic questions. Why so many financial contracts? And why 
so many transitive-risk contract relationships? One 
explanation is that financial institutions, their customers, and 
rating agencies, engage in self-serving opportunistic behavior. 
They used financial contracts—in express or tacit collusion—to 
transfer risks to unsuspecting, underinformed (or, in some 
instances, misinformed) third parties. A second possible 
explanation is far less nefarious. Pursuant to this explanation, 
in the period leading to the Great Recession, financial 
engineers took standard securities and divided them into a 
series of new rights and obligations that allowed parties to 
better allocate risks.3 This disaggregation–reaggregation 
process eventually led to the creation and distribution of a 
large number of new securities—some relatively simple, others 
extremely complex.  
In detailing the operation of transitive-risk contracts 
and their role in transferring transitive counterparty risk, the 
analysis developed in this article provides a positive account of 
                                                
 3 This fragmentation of standard transactions into a sequence of 
subtransactions had an important aim: to approximate the type of state-contingent 
securities introduced by the economists Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu. But once 
disaggregated into myriad subtransactions, it became possible to recombine them in various 
different ways, both to disperse risk and engage in speculation. See infra Part II.C.  
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modern financial markets, financial contracting, and complex 
financial institutions, including the interconnectedness between 
financial institutions that led to the collapse of Bear Stearns and 
Lehman Brothers. The next step—which is beyond the scope of 
this article—will be to provide an account of how to design legal 
rules (and contracts) to deal with transitive counterparty risks.  
Part I provides an overview of financial contracts and 
financial institutions. Part II develops a positive account of the 
fragmentation of financial transactions, and, in doing so, 
provides an account of contractual relationships among financial 
institutions and between institutions and their customers. Part 
III sets forth a new theory of the interconnection of financial 
contracts and, by extension, the interconnection among financial 
institutions that are either parties to those contracts or 
indirectly affected by them. In the absence of any such theory, 
regulators will find it virtually impossible to craft and 
implement the kind of macroprudential regulations required by 
the Dodd-Frank Act, and to test, in real time, whether those 
regulations are working as expected and address any 
shortcomings. Part IV applies the theory to a number of general 
scenarios involving financial institutions and financial contracts.  
I. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: BACKGROUND 
Households and business firms own real assets, such as 
personal and real property, and, in the case of firms, raw 
materials and equipment, which they use to produce and 
market goods and services; both also may own intangible 
assets,4 including intellectual property and human capital,5 and 
financial assets, such as equity6 or debt7 securities. A financial 
                                                
 4 Real assets also include intangible assets, such as intellectual property. See 
THOMAS S.Y. HO & SANG BIN LEE, THE OXFORD GUIDE TO FINANCIAL MODELING 17 (2004) 
(drawing a distinction between two types of real assets, tangible and intangible assets). 
 5 See GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL 33-51 (3d ed. 1993) (discussing value 
of education as investment in human capital). 
 6 An equity security such as common stock creates ownership rights, 
including the right to vote on certain corporate matters and to receive dividends, when 
declared by the board, and liquidation distributions. Preferred stock is a second type of 
equity security, one that has certain preferences over common stock, such as a priority 
over dividends and liquidation distributions. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 151 
(2013) (describing common and preferred stock). 
 7 For example, a debt contract creates a contractual claim on assets that 
backs up the debtor’s promise to pay the interest and principal when due; it also 
provides the creditor with contingent control rights, in case the debtor defaults See 
JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 80-87 (2006) (describing various 
aspects of loan agreements and debt securities, including the pledging of collateral, the 
use of positive and negative covenants, and consequences of default and bankruptcy). 
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asset is a claim on the cash flows produced by real assets, and, 
as such, it is a useful device for valuing those underlying 
assets8 and controlling their use and disposition.9 Financial 
institutions help households and firms (including other 
financial institutions) manage investment risks associated with 
holding financial assets and the liquidity risks associated with 
varying cash flows and investment or consumption opportunities. 
Financial institutions, however, own primarily financial assets, 
and they finance their operations mostly by borrowing funds, 
often on a short-term basis. These characteristics of their balance 
sheet expose them to liquidity and insolvency risks that can 
spill over to other financial institutions, as well as to 
households and non-financial firms.10  
This part begins by describing liquidity problems and how 
financial institutions help alleviate them. It continues by 
explaining how financial institutions act as investment 
intermediaries, helping firms and households deal with the 
informational asymmetry problems inherent in investment 
decisions. The part concludes by analyzing liquidity problems 
within financial institutions and by providing a normative 
account of why the fragility of institutions matters. 
A. Liquidity Problems and Financial Intermediaries 
The actors charged with running firms and households 
operate within an intertemporal framework: in each period 
they make decisions that can affect their current and future 
welfare.11 More specifically, at time t, an actor will choose the 
                                                
 8 See HO & LEE, supra note 4, at 17 (defining financial assets as claims on 
real assets, and describing their use in valuing those assets). Financial assets may also 
involve claims over intangible assets such as human capital. An individual can, for 
example, borrow against her expected future earnings. See Theo S. Eicher, Human 
Capital and Technological Change, 63 REV. ECON. STUDIES 127, 129 (1996) (developing 
theory in which individuals borrow to acquire human capital, in expectation of future 
income); Oliver Hart & John Moore, A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of 
Human Capital, 109 Q. J. ECON. 841, 841-42 (1994) (discussing borrowing constraints 
based on ability of debtors to threaten to withdraw their human capital after they have 
received money, a strategy that they would use in order to renegotiate the original debt 
contract on more favorable terms). 
 9 See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 56-59 
(1995) (describing role of real assets in establishing authority and power within 
business firms). 
 10 See Jean Tirole, Illiquidity and All Its Friends, 49 J. ECON. LIT. 287, 
297-98 (2011). 
 11 See George Loewenstein & Richard H. Thaler, Inter-temporal Choice, J. 
ECON. PERSP., Fall 1989, at 181, 181 (defining intertemporal choices as “decisions in 
which the timing of costs and benefits are spread out over time”). In choosing a course 
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consumption or investment strategy that will maximize her 
intertemporal utility. In doing so, she will take into account the 
instantaneous utility from using part of her wealth to consume 
goods in the current period. She will also take into account the 
expected returns (properly discounted to account for her 
impatience), if she decides to invest that portion of her wealth 
and delay her consumption.12 
As a general matter, firms and households prefer to 
“smooth” their consumption over time.13 In order to smooth 
consumption effectively and ensure that funds will be available 
if an investment opportunity arises, both firms and households 
must predict: (1) when they expect to need the funds; and (2) 
the likelihood that they will have access to those funds, either 
by using cash savings, transforming some of their assets into 
cash, borrowing funds, or in the case of firms, selling equity or 
debt securities.14 A firm or household has a “liquidity problem”15 
if it needs funds—to consume, pay debts, or invest in a valuable 
project—at a particular point in time and does not have access 
  
of action, at time t, a rational actor will take into account the instantaneous utility, if 
any, that it will receive immediately, ut, which will depend on the current state of the 
world, st, and the payoffs, xt, given that state of the world. This may be expressed as ut 
(xt|st). It will look into the future, and thus choose the course of action that will 
maximize the sum of instantaneous utility in the current period and in each relevant 
future period; it will discount the latter to account for: (1) the uncertainty regarding 
future states of the world, using its subjective probability distribution over these future 
states; and (2) the actor’s impatience, as captured by her discount factor, δ. If we let p(st+1) 
capture the probability distribution over possible states in period t + 1, then, in period t, 
the actor will determine the expected payoffs, discounting them, in turn, by δ, to account 
for its impatience. Under the standard intertemporal model individuals are assumed to 
use an intertemporal utility function that captures the sum of their utility over their 
whole life. See Robert J. Barro and James W. Friedman, On Uncertain Lifetimes, J. POL. 
ECON. 843, 844-46 (1977) (developing intertemporal utility model in which individuals 
maximizes the sum of their utility over a lifetime and where positive discounting is due to 
the potential that individual will die before being able to consume goods). 
 12 That is, the actor may invest funds, at time t, in order to produce greater 
wealth at time t + 1. Alternatively, it may choose to consume in period t and borrow 
funds at time t + 1 to finance further consumption or to make investments. The actor 
will save at time t only if the rate of return on that investment is at least as high as its 
personal impatience captured by δ. 
 13 See John H. Cochrane, A Simple Test of Consumption Insurance, 99 J. POL. 
ECON. 557, 557-59 (1991) (summarizing arguments regarding preference for income 
smoothing in households). See TIROLE, supra note 7, at 212-13 (discussing reaction of 
firms to uncertainty regarding future liquidity, and incentive to hoard cash, to smooth 
over low cash flow periods). 
 14 See Tirole, supra note 10, at 288 (describing liquidity as “stores of value”).  
 15 See TIROLE, supra note 7, at 199-201 (describing fact that firms will worry 
about future ability to finance valuable projects, make further investments in existing 
projects, or pay creditors on a timely fashion, stating that such “liquidity shortages 
reflect an inadequacy between available resources and refinancing needs,” and 
providing examples of typical types of liquidity problems). 
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to them or the cost of acquiring them (by selling assets, 
borrowing, or selling equity) is sufficiently high.16 
Banks,17 investment banks,18 insurance companies,19 
hedge funds,20 and private equity funds,21 are in the business of 
creating and dealing with financial claims.22 As such, they play 
an important role in helping firms and households smooth 
consumption, and thus to deal with liquidity problems. Some 
types of financial contracts allow investors to borrow funds 
                                                
 16 See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit 
Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401 (1983) (setting forth such a model to 
explain role of banks in helping reduce liquidity risks). 
 17 See XAVIER FREIXAS & JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET, MICROECONOMICS OF 
BANKING 1 (1997) (defining a bank as a firm whose “operations consist in granting 
loans and receiving deposits from the public”). The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 
defines a “bank” as an “insured bank” under the FDIC Act or any institution organized 
under Federal or state law which both accepts demand deposits and is in the business 
of making commercial loans. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1) (2006). Under the FDIC Act, an 
“insured bank” is a state or federally chartered bank whose deposits are insured by the 
FDIC. Id. § 1813(a) and (h). 
 18 Investment banks act as underwriters, brokers and dealers, and advisors 
in takeovers and other types of transactions. See Section 2(a)(11) of Securities Act of 
1933 (defining “underwriter” as “any person who has purchased from an issuer with a 
view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any 
security”). Securities Act of 1933, ch, 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 77a-77aa (2006)). Section 3(a)(4)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines a 
“broker” as any person “engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities 
for the account of others.” Section 3(a)(5)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
defines a “dealer” as “any person engaged in the business of buying and selling 
securities . . . for such person’s own account through a broker or otherwise.” Securities 
Act of 1934, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006)).  
 19 Section 201(a)(13) of the Dodd-Frank Act defines an “insurance company” 
as “any entity that is—(A) engaged in the business of insurance; (B) subject to 
regulation by a State insurance regulator; and (C) covered by a State law that is 
designed to specifically deal with the rehabilitation, liquidation, or insolvency of an 
insurance company.” Dodd Frank Act, Pub. L. No 111-203 (2010). 
 20 See Nicholas Chan et al., Do Hedge Funds Increase Systemic Risks?, ECON. 
REV. FEDERAL RESERVE OF ATLANTA 49, 49 (Fourth Quarter 2006) (defining hedge 
funds as “investment partnerships that engage in a variety of active trading strategies” 
on behalf of investors). 
 21 See Dodd-Frank Act, § 619 (h)(2) (defining private equity and hedge funds 
as “issuers that would be an investment company, as defined in the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 . . . , but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act, or such similar 
funds as the appropriate Federal banking agencies, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission may, by rule, as 
provided in subsection (b)(2), determine”).  
 22 More generally, financial intermediaries transform one type of financial 
claim into another by entering into financial contracts with investors and firms that 
need capital. See FREIXAS & ROCHET, supra note 17, at 15 (defining financial 
intermediaries as firms that “specialize[] in . . . buying and selling (at the same time) 
financial contracts and securities” and who are in the business of transforming 
financial inputs into outputs); see also Evan Gatev & Philip E. Straham, Banks’ 
Advantage in Hedging Liquidity Risk: Theory and Evidence from the Commercial Paper 
Market, 61 J. FIN. 867, 870-71 (describing role played by commercial paper facilities in 
providing liquidity, as an alternative to funding by financial intermediaries such as banks). 
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from institutions;23 others, allow them to lend funds to 
institutions on a short-term basis, which is important, given 
that short-maturities help alleviate liquidity risks.24 More 
generally, a financial institution enters into contracts with its 
customers whereby the latter makes one or more payments in 
return for the institution’s promise to distribute funds, deliver 
commodities or securities, or perform some other activity at a 
later time.25  
For example, a demand deposit26 account allows 
depositors to lend money to a bank in return for a promise that 
they can withdraw their funds, without penalty, whenever they 
need them, simply by making a “demand” on the bank.27 An 
                                                
 23 For example, business firms and households can set up lines of credit with 
banks to deal with liquidity shocks that require quick access to funds. See Arie Melnik 
& Steven Plaut, Loan Commitment Contracts, Terms of Lending, and Credit Allocation, 
41 J. FIN. 425, 426-27 (1986) (discussing role of line of credits in providing contingent 
liquidity).  
 24 See FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL 
CRISES 58-59 (2007) (discussing problem of consumers’ uncertain future liquidity 
preferences and role of banks in reducing risk).  
 25 See Robert C. Merton, A Functional Perspective of Financial 
Intermediation, 24 FIN. MANAGEMENT 23, 24 (1995) (describing role of financial 
intermediaries in “issuing contingent-payment contracts to their customers”); FREIXAS 
& ROCHET, supra note 17, at 2-4 (describing various liquidity and payment services 
provided by banks. 
 26 When a customer opens a demand deposit account at a bank, it acquires a 
financial contract that allows it to make withdrawals at any time and potentially 
receive interest payments in the meantime. See 12 C.F.R. § 204.2 (b)(1) (2009) (defining 
a “demand deposit” as a deposit with a bank that is payable on demand). 
 27  Assume that in Period 0, a group of individuals deposit funds in a bank. In 
Period 1, the short-term depositors will need liquid assets and will withdraw their 
funds; the long-term depositors, on the other hand, will leave their money in the bank 
until Period 2. The problem is that in Period 0, none of the individuals know whether 
they will be short-term or long-term depositors. In other words, each individual is 
making an intertemporal decision in which its future utility, u1, in Period 1, depends 
on which state of the world, s1, emerges and the payoffs, x1, under the possible states. 
There are two possible states of the world: the individual will have no need for the 
liquid assets, or the individual will need them to consume or make an investment. If 
the individual can correctly predict that she will not need liquid assets during Period 1, 
then she would maximize her return by making a long-term investment, lasting two 
periods, and producing a Period 2 payoff that is larger than if she had preserved the 
option to withdraw funds during Period 1. On the other hand, if she misjudges and 
commits to a long-term investment but turns out to need the funds in Period 1, then 
she will experience a liquidity problem. Banks can help reduce this liquidity risk by 
providing depositors with a “real option”: a depositor with a demand deposit account 
can wait until she learns whether she is a short-term or long-term depositor during 
Period 1. In Period 0, the bank will lend a portion of those deposits to borrowers, who 
agree to repay in Period 2, at an interest rate that is high enough to reflect the fact 
that they will keep the funds for two periods. Borrowers that want uninterrupted 
access to funds are willing to pay a premium for a long-term two-period loan as opposed 
to two short-term one-period loans (given that there is some probability the bank will 
refuse to roll over the loan in Period 1). In determining how much it can lend, a bank 
will predict how many depositors will withdraw their funds in Period 1 and it will keep 
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insurance company sells policies to customers who pay 
premiums in return for the company’s obligation to pay out a 
certain amount upon the occurrence of a specified event, such 
as a fire or death.28 Insurance, therefore, allows households and 
businesses to deal with unforeseen contingencies that can 
affect their cash flows. Moreover, non-insurance companies can 
sell products that are functionally equivalent to insurance, 
such as credit default swaps, in which the owner of a debt 
security makes “premium” payments to a third party in return 
for a promise to make a “payout” to it if the issuer of the 
security defaults. Mortgage-backed securities and other more 
traditional types of pooling and selling future cash flows—such 
as the sale of account receivables to a factor—allow lenders to 
manage their liquidity needs.29 Mortgage-backed securities in 
turn help reduce the cost of borrowing for homeowners, 
allowing easier access to second mortgages and lines of credit.30  
B. Financial Institutions as Investment Intermediaries  
A shareholder’s returns will depend on the actions of the 
company’s managers, creditors, and other shareholders; it will 
also depend on her own vigilance and diversification decisions. 
The same is true of debtholders, although their risk of loss is not 
as great, given that they have a contractual right that is prior to 
that of shareholders. Both types of investors can search for their 
own investment opportunities—the screening process—and 
  
the appropriate reserves. Because banks have a large number of depositors, they can 
achieve some degree of diversification regarding the different maturity dates of 
depositors and better match the longer-term maturity dates of borrowers. See Gary 
Gorton, Bank Regulation When ‘Banks’ and ‘Banking’ Are Not the Same, 10 OXFORD 
REV. ECON. POL’Y 106, 117 (1994) (describing role of bank in reducing depositors’ 
liquidity risks while providing almost risk-free security); ALLEN & GALE, supra note 24, 
at 52-54 (explaining why borrowers are willing to pay a bank a higher rate in order to 
achieve longer maturities than they would get if they directly transacted with 
depositors, who, as a general matter, want to keep their assets relatively liquid).  
 28 See Paul v. State of Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 172 (1868) (stating that an 
insurance contract involves “exchanging sums of money for promises of indemnity 
against losses”).  
 29 Loans are assets on a bank’s balance sheet and are relatively illiquid. Loan 
participations and securitization transactions are two devices used by banks to sell 
parts or all of a loan before maturity. See Richard Y. Roberts & Randall W. Quinn, 
Leveling the Playing Field: The Need for Investor Protection for Bank Sales of Loan 
Participations, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 2115, 2117-20 (1995) (providing an overview of 
loan participation transactions); Tamar Frankel, Securitization: The Conflict Between 
Personal and Market Law (Contract and Property), 18 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 197, 202-
09 (1999) (giving an overview of the securitization process). 
30 BOND MKT. ASS’N, AN INVESTOR’S GUIDE TO PASS-THROUGH AND COLLATERALIZED 
MORTGAGE SECURITIES 2, available at http://www.freddiemac.com/mbs/docs/about_MBS.pdf. 
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monitor managers after the fact. On the other hand, they may 
delegate some or all of these screening and monitoring tasks to 
financial institutions, thereby avoiding wasteful duplication of 
effort31 and making use of economies of scale.32 More generally, 
financial intermediaries use their expertise to reduce two 
informational risks faced by investors: the adverse selection33 
and agency34 problems.35 For example, investors entrust their 
money to mutual funds,36 hedge funds, private equity firms, and 
venture capital partnerships, who promise to invest it on their 
behalf in return for a management fee.37 
                                                
 31 See Sudipto Bhattacharya et al., Monitoring by and of Banks: A Discussion, 
in CREDIT, INTERMEDIATION, AND THE MACROECONOMY: READINGS AND PERSPECTIVES 
IN MODERN FINANCIAL THEORY 122 (Sudipto Bhattacharya et al. eds., 2004) (stating 
that informational intermediaries are able to avoid duplicative screening). 
 32 See Ram T.S. Ramakrishnan & Anjan V. Thakor, Information Reliability 
and a Theory of Financial Intermediation, 51 REV. ECON. STUD. 415-32 (1984) (making 
an economies of scale argument in the context of delegated monitoring to 
intermediaries).  
 33 Adverse selection problems arise whenever a firm seeks funds from outside 
investors. Because managers know more about the firm’s current financial state, 
potential investors will discount for the risk that they may be buying into a “lemon.” 
Unless “good firms” can credibly signal that they are not lemons, they will face higher 
funding costs and, in some cases, may not be able to raise funds. In order for the signal 
to be credible and effective it has to be one that cannot be mimicked by an 
entrepreneur with a bad project. See George Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: 
Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (setting 
forth standard treatment of adverse selection problem in context of used car dealers, 
which have informational advantage over potential purchases of “lemons”); Stewart C. 
Myers & Nicholas Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms 
Have Information that Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 188 (1984); 
TIROLE, supra note 7, at 52 (discussing adverse selection problem when companies try 
to raise additional funds by selling equity or debt securities to capital markets). 
 34 After an investment is made, managers may fail to act in the best interest 
of investors. This type of agency problem is sometimes referred to as a “moral hazard” 
problem. See TIROLE, supra note 7, at 113.  
 35 Financial institutions have special expertise in dealing with adverse 
selection and agency problems, by screening and monitoring investments on behalf of 
their customers. See FREIXAS & ROCHET, supra note 17, at 29-32 (discussing role played 
by banks in reducing adverse selection and agency problems). 
 36 A mutual fund is subject to the Investment Company Act because it falls 
under the definition of an “investment company.” An investment company is an issuer 
that “is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, 
in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities.” See the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A) (2006).  
 37 These institutions are obligated to safeguard these funds and return them 
to the clients, either on demand or on a delayed basis. For example, hedge funds will 
generally restrict the ability of clients to withdraw funds without providing a sufficient 
amount of notice. This will allow the funds to invest in more illiquid assets. See Andrei 
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35, 47 (1997) 
(discussing problem faced by hedge funds if investors withdraw funds en masse and 
describing contractual provisions in some fund contracts that restrict the ability to 
withdraw capital at will). 
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C. Leverage and Insolvency Risks for Financial Institutions  
Financial institutions fund their businesses primarily 
by borrowing funds,38 and thus, compared to non-financial 
firms, they are more highly leveraged39 and more susceptible to 
insolvency and failure.40 Their obligations, moreover, include 
standard long-term and short-term debt, as well as 
nonstandard liabilities, such as the contractual obligations to 
customers discussed above. As a general matter, a financial 
institution will have an incentive to increase its leverage 
whenever it believes that an investment will yield a higher 
return than the interest it will pay to finance it.41 Moreover, if it 
has easy access to credit, it will be able to enter into a greater 
number of investments than if it had to sell equity or rely 
solely on internally produced cash flows.42 While easy access to 
                                                
 38 See James Bullard et al., Systemic Risk and the Financial Crisis: A Primer, 91 
FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 403, 409 (2009), available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/ 
publications/review/09/09/part1/Bullard.pdf.  
 39 See TIROLE, supra note 7, at 98-99 (stating that banks have large debt-to-
equity ratios). A firm’s leverage or debt-to-equity ratio captures the extent to which 
equity holders are relying on other people’s money to finance operations. A number of 
related leverage ratios are useful in assessing the risk that a firm has borrowed too 
much money. See ASWATH DAMODARAN, INVESTMENT VALUATION: TOOLS AND 
TECHNIQUES FOR DETERMINING THE VALUE OF ANY ASSET 51 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing 
debt-to-equity, long-term debt-to-total-capital, and market-value-debt-to-equity ratios). 
 40 See ALLEN & GALE, supra note 24, at 126-27 (discussing fragility of 
financial institutions and the effect of their failure on financial markets, as well as the 
role of market volatility in threatening viability of institutions). 
 41 Borrowing money is like renting an apartment. In both cases, one takes 
possession of someone else’s property for a period of time, paying for the privilege of 
using that property and agreeing to return it at the end of the term. The goal is to create 
a return from renting and using the property that exceeds the “rental” payments. 
 42 Some theorists have argued that increasing a firm’s leverage is an 
important tool in reducing the agency costs created by managers, since unlike equity, 
debt obligates managers to distribute a portion of its cash flows back to the capital 
markets. This pay-out obligation restricts the ability of managers to use the cash for 
wasteful investment projects. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, 
Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986) (developing free cash 
flow theory in which agency costs are reduced by tying managers hands with debt 
payout obligations). This theory fails, however, to take into account the fact that the 
decision to borrow money is made endogenously by the same managers, who 
presumably would tie their hands only if they anticipated a need to pay out free cash 
flows in the future. Without such a need, managers would see no reason to so bind 
themselves unless they anticipated self-control problems that could lead them to 
engage in suboptimal investments in the future. Nevertheless, the free cash flow 
theory adopts the standard economic assumption that actors are fully rational and thus 
have perfect self-control. See generally Manuel A. Utset, Procrastination and the Law, 
in THE THIEF OF TIME: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON PROCRASTINATION 253 (Chrisoula 
Andreou & Mark D. White eds., 2010) (developing a procrastination model in which 
actors with preferences for immediate gratification would repeatedly delay carrying out 
actions they believed to be optimal in the long-term).  
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credit helps magnify potential profits, it also magnifies 
potential losses.43  
Highly leveraged firms can become insolvent44 if the 
value of their marketable assets or their cash flows are 
subjected to unexpected outside shocks.45 In the case of 
financial institutions these assets are primarily intangible in 
nature, such as loans and securities,46 including complex 
derivatives, that are difficult to value and sell quickly, when an 
institution is facing a liquidity crisis;47 and their cash flows are 
generated primarily from proprietary investments and 
transactions with customers, who may withdraw their business 
upon the first sign of trouble. Insolvency can trigger defaults in 
credit agreements, leading to bankruptcy proceedings48 in a 
bankruptcy court or, in the case of insured financial institutions, 
through the resolution authority granted to the FDIC.49 
D. Liquidity Problems Faced by Financial Institutions 
Modern financial institutions are in the business of 
borrowing on a short-term basis and using those funds to make 
                                                
 43 See Chan et al., supra note 20, at 50 (stating that leverage helps to expand 
small profit opportunities into large ones while also increasing the potential for 
transforming small losses into larger ones).  
 44 As a general matter, a firm is insolvent if it has more liabilities than 
assets. See Edward I. Altman, Financial Rations, Discriminant Analysis and the 
Predictions of Corporate Bankruptcy, 23 J. FIN. 589, 595 (1968) (defining insolvency as 
state in which the “total liabilities exceed a fair valuation of the firm’s assets with 
value determined by the earning power of the assets.”).  
 45 See ZVI BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 472 (2005) (stating that if leverage 
ratio is too high it may be a sign that firm has taken on too much debt and may be unable 
to generate enough earnings to pay the principal and interest as it becomes due).  
 46 Financial assets, such as securities, are more complex than tangible assets 
such as equipment and inventory, in part because they are more volatile and deal with 
a large number of potential future states of the world. See Karen Eggleston et al., The 
Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 91, 
97-100 (2000) (arguing that contractual complexity increases with “(1) the expected 
number of payoff-relevant contingencies specified in the contract; [and] (2) the variance 
in the magnitude of the payoffs contracted to flow between the parties,” since these 
create more states of the world for a decisionmaker to take into account). 
 47 See Viral Acharya et al., The Financial Crisis of 2007–2009: Causes and 
Remedies, 18 FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS 89, 92 (2009). 
 48 See TIROLE, supra note 7, at 52 (discussing the expected costs of 
bankruptcy associated with borrowing more money).  
 49 See 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (2006) (discussing triggering events for FDIC 
intervention and prompt corrective actions). After the Dodd-Frank Act, systemically 
important institutions will also be treated in this manner. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 201-17 (2010).  
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long-term loans or purchase relatively illiquid assets.50 
Financial institutions borrow on a short-term basis, with the 
expectation that they will be able to continually renew their 
short-term loans (that is, to roll over those loans) each time 
they mature. If a financial institution successfully matches its 
short-term borrowings with its long-term loans51 and illiquid 
investments, it will make a profit equal to the difference 
between the amount it pays to borrow on a short-term basis and 
the higher return from these riskier, longer-term transactions. 
If, on the other hand, a financial institution cannot continue 
borrowing on a short-term basis or secure longer-term financing 
quickly, it will face a liquidity problem.52 The institution will 
thus have to pay more to borrow, post more collateral,53 or, 
alternatively, sell some of its long-term assets, usually at a 
discount. This sort of liquidity risk is referred to as the 
“maturity mismatch problem,” because it stems from the 
difference in maturity between an institution’s sources of funds 
and the loans or investments made with those funds.54  
E. Why the Failure of Financial Institutions Matters 
The period leading to the Great Recession was one of 
great creativity in liquidity and portfolio management: some 
innovations helped increase overall social welfare; others, 
however, ended up creating unforeseen insolvency and liquidity 
risks for financial intermediaries. Parties to a contract always 
bear a risk that the other party will default on its obligations—
the “counterparty risk.” Given the relative fragility of financial 
institutions, due to the insolvency and liquidity risks discussed 
in the previous two sections, one would expect that financial 
contracts involve higher levels of counterparty risk than 
contracts between business firms and their customers or 
suppliers.55 Moreover, the failure of a financial institution can 
                                                
 50 See Gary Gorton & Andrew Winton, Financial Intermediation, in 
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 435 (G.M. Constantinides et al. eds., 2003) 
(describing the differences between securities issued to borrowers and lenders). 
 51 Long-term loans command a higher return because they are riskier: they require 
purchasers to lock in their funds until the assets are sold or mature. See supra note 26. 
 52 See generally Tirole, supra note 10 (providing an overview of different 
aspects of liquidity in financial institutions and the role played by sudden illiquidity in 
precipitating Great Recession). 
 53 See id. at 288-90 (discussing the role played by funding and market illiquidity). 
 54 See Leonardo Gambacorta & Paolo Emilio Mistrulli, Does Bank Capital 
Affect Lending Behavior?, 13 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 436, 437 (2004). 
 55 See Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, Efficient Governance Structure: 
Implication for Banking Regulation, in CAPITAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 
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impose negative externalities on a larger portion of society. 
When a business firm fails, the consequences are felt primarily 
by its shareholders, creditors, and employees, not by its 
customers.56 By contrast, a financial institution’s customers 
enter into contractual relationships that place them in a 
particularly vulnerable position if the institution fails.57 The 
managers of financial institutions, in short, can impose agency 
costs both on investors58 and customers.59 This risk of loss for 
customers is one of the reasons why financial institutions face 
more strenuous regulatory oversight than do business firms.60 
  
12, 18-26 (Colin Mayer & Xavier Vives eds., 1993) (developing informational asymmetry and 
agency model and extending it to financial firms, such as banks). 
 56 There are of course exceptions. A customer that is relying on a producer to 
supply unique or custom-made products will suffer some transitional costs until it can 
find an alternate supplier. A customer of this type enters into the contract in order to 
assure that it will have the requisite supply of goods at the time that it needs them. 
One would expect that customers who are entering into long-term contracts for the 
provision of specialized goods to discount for the risks of unforeseen contingencies as 
well as for the potential opportunistic seller. See Merton, supra note 25, at 35 
(discussing the difference between business firms that sell products with warranty and 
financial firms).  
 57 The customers of a financial institution will include both the providers of 
funds, such as bank depositors, and borrowers. While depositors are in a more 
vulnerable position than borrowers, a bank’s failure can create harm for both types of 
customers, particularly short-term borrowers who were expecting that the bank would 
continue to roll-over the loans. See Graciela L. Kaminsky et al., The Unholy Trinity of 
Financial Contagion, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 51, 54 (2003). For example, a bank that is a 
repeat player with a borrower will have private information about the borrower’s 
business that will allow it to better price the loan transaction and adopt the requisite 
loan covenants. If a bank fails, the borrower will have to find a new lender who will not 
have access to this private information and will protect itself by charging a higher 
interest rate. As a result, one cost of a bank’s failure is that valuable information about 
borrowers is lost. See Xavier Freixas & Anthony M. Santomero, An Overall Perspective 
on Banking Regulation, in FINANCIAL REGULATION 429 (A. Boot et al. eds., 2002) 
(describing social cost of lost information about borrowers); Myron B. Slovin, Marie E. 
Sushka & John A. Polonchek, The Value of Bank Durability: Borrowers as Bank 
Stakeholders, 48 J. FIN. 247, 256-57 (1993) (empirical study finding that the failure of 
Continental Illinois had a negative effect on market value of firms with a known 
borrowing relationship with the bank); Nobuyoshi Yamori & Akinobu Murakami, Does 
Bank Relationship Have an Economic Value?: The Effect of Main Bank Failure on Client 
Firms, 65 ECON. LETTERS 115, 117-18 (1999) (empirical study after failure of large Japanese 
bank, finding that customers with closest borrowing relationship with bank suffered large 
negative reaction in stock price after announcement of bank’s problems).  
 58 Moreover, since managers owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders, they will 
sometimes have incentives to manage a firm to maximize returns to shareholders, at 
the expense of other constituencies, including a firm’s customers.  
 59 See Merton, supra note 25, at 34 (arguing that customers of financial firms 
enter into transactions expecting that firms will be able to perform their obligations at 
the allotted time, while investors value firms based on expected returns but also taking 
into account risk of insolvency).  
 60 See FREIXAS & ROCHET, supra note 17, at 263-65. An additional reason for 
the prevalence of regulations to protect the customers of financial institutions is that 
as they get closer to insolvency, their shareholders will have an incentive to undertake 
very risky transactions to “gamble for resurrection.” See Dewatripont & Tirole, supra 
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Many of these regulations, however, were designed to reduce the 
risk that a financial institution’s failure would harm the real 
sector of the economy, households, and nonfinancial firms.61  
The spillover effect of an institution’s failure extends 
beyond the losses borne by customers. The failure of a 
sufficiently large, highly interconnected financial institution 
can lead to the failure of other institutions. In fact, even 
relatively small shocks to one part of the financial system can 
quickly spread to others,62 precipitating a crisis63 that could 
threaten the entire system64 if market participants and 
regulators fail to take corrective steps quickly enough.65  
  
note 55, at 26-28 (discussing perverse incentive of shareholders to increase risks at 
expense of customers of financial intermediaries and increased incentive of managers 
to hide problems).  
 61 See Ben Bernanke & Mark Gertler, Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business 
Fluctuations, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 14, 14 (1989) (discussing interaction between systemic 
problems in the financial sector and the real sector and a potential for contagion from 
one to the other). 
 62 The likelihood that a financial shock will spill over to other parts of the 
system is called “systemic risk.” See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 
204, 204 (2008) (defining systemic risk as the “risk that (i) an economic shock such as 
market or institutional failure triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the 
failure of a chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to 
financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its 
availability, often evidenced by substantial financial-market price volatility”); Hedge 
Funds, Systematic Risk, and the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008, Hearing Before the 
Comm. On Oversight of Gov. Reform (written testimony of Prof. Andrew Lo, MIT School 
of Management) [hereinafter Lo] (defining systemic risk as the risk of a “broad-based 
breakdown in the financial system, often realized as a series of correlated defaults 
among financial institutions, typically banks, that occurs over a short-period of time 
and typically caused by a single major event”). 
 63 A “financial crisis” arises whenever a relatively small change in the 
financial system triggers a wide swing in the overall or aggregate state of the system. 
See MARKUS K. BRUNNERMEIER, ASSET PRICING UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION: 
BUBBLES, CRASHES, TECHNICAL ANALYSIS, AND HERDING 220 (2001) (as a general 
matter, a “financial crisis” is a system-wide crisis affecting one or more parts of a 
financial system). 
 64 See James Crotty, Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: A 
Critical Assessment of the “New Financial Architecture”, 33 CAMB. J. ECON. 563, 572-73 
(2009) (describing system-wide risk in the context of financial crises). 
 65 In fact, while the subprime crisis created great harm for many households, 
it played only a relatively small role in the Great Recession. See Markus K. 
Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008, 23 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 77, 77 (2009) (describing the losses due to subprime loans as “relatively modest” 
compared to the losses when the stock market subsequently crashed); Gary Gorton, 
The Subprime Panic, 15 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 10, 30-31 (2009) (arguing that losses in the 
subprime market were not enough to trigger the crisis until it became “common 
knowledge” due to introduction of the ABX index, which allowed traders to hedge and 
speculate vis-à-vis deteriorating portfolios of asset-backed securities).  
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II. DERIVED FROM ARROW: THE FRAGMENTATION OF 
FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 
In a world of complete capital markets, parties would be 
able to hedge against all possible risks. But capital markets 
work best when the traded securities are not too complex, so 
that market participants can understand them and value them 
accurately, in a timely fashion.66 This part examines the extent 
to which it is possible to design and implement complete 
markets and the costs of attempting to do so but falling short. 
It begins by examining the role of securities markets and the 
problems of excessive speculation and self-dealing in market 
transactions. It then describes the general theory of complete 
markets and state-contingent securities. It concludes by 
arguing that the quest for complete markets has led to a 
fragmentation of transactions and the emergence of n-
contracts-transactions.  
A. Securities Markets and the Great Recession 
Parties will create and administer securities markets 
only to the extent that the benefits exceed the costs.67 So how do 
securities markets create value? First, they provide a venue for 
hedging—that is, distributing risk from risk-averse actors to 
                                                
 66 See Robert C. Merton, A Functional Perspective of Financial 
Intermediation, 24 FIN. MGMT. 23, 26 (1995) (arguing that financial markets are 
efficient alternatives to financial intermediaries but only to the extent that securities 
are standardized, widely distributed, and “well-enough ‘understood’ for transactors to 
be comfortable in assessing their prices”).  
 67 See Stephen A. Ross, Options and Efficiency, 90 Q.J. ECON. 75, 76 (1976) 
(discussing cost-benefit analysis involved in setting up contingent-state markets). 
Financial institutions play an important role in reducing the transaction costs of using 
financial markets, including establishing and administering payment and clearing 
facilities for financial transactions. See MAUREEN O’HARA, MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE 
THEORY 14-16 (1995) (describing ways in which financial institutions help create 
markets, including helping facilitate transactions and assuring that there is sufficient 
liquidity for those wishing to trade); Xavier Freixas & Bruno Parigi, Contagion and 
Efficiency in Gross and Net Interbank Payment Systems, in CREDIT, INTERMEDIATION, 
AND THE MACROECONOMY, supra note 31, at 297, 299-302 (describing interbank 
payment systems and the role of financial institutions in assuring that they operate 
without interruptions); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act § 803(7)(A)-(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5462(7) (2010) (defining “payment, clearing, 
or settlement activity” as “an activity carried out by 1 or more financial institutions to 
facilitate the completion of financial transactions”, including “(i) funds transfers; (ii) 
securities contracts; (iii) contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery; (iv) 
forward contracts; (v) repurchase agreements; (vi) swaps; (vii) security-based swaps; 
(viii) swap agreements; (ix) security-based swap agreements; (x) foreign exchange 
contracts; (xi) financial derivatives contracts; and (xii) any similar transaction that the 
Council determines to be a financial transaction for purposes of this title.”). 
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those who are either less risk averse or have the expertise or 
tools to deal with the risk more effectively. In other words, a 
hedge transaction occurs when party A sells its risk to party B 
for a premium, in a transaction where both parties benefit.68 
Second, securities markets allow parties to speculate. The 
speculator purchases a security not for its dividends or interest 
payments, but for the potential capital gain.69 Third, securities 
markets help aggregate and transfer70 information regarding 
the securities traded. In a perfectly efficient market, the 
market price will reflect the aggregate beliefs and expectations 
of market participants.71  
The Great Recession was caused in part by parties who 
engaged in excessive “hedging” using securities that provided 
them with a false sense of security and by excessive speculation 
in markets with critical inefficiencies.72 This, in turn, led to the 
demand for a greater number of financial contracts for hedging 
and speculating, and the introduction of a plethora of new 
securities. Self-dealing, gross negligence, and fraud also played 
a role in the proliferation of transactions, such as those involving 
                                                
 68 In an insurance contract, a risk-averse individual sells a risk—for example, 
the risk of a fire, automobile accident, or illness—to an insurance company, which has 
the expertise, technology (in the form of actuarial tables), and ability to diversify that 
risk. In return for buying that risk, the insurance company receives a premium. See 
generally Neil A. Doherty & Harris Schlesinger, Rational Insurance Purchasing: 
Consideration of Contract Nonperformance, 105 Q.J. ECON. 243 (1990).  
 69 See TIROLE, supra note 7, at 290, 314-15 (describing speculation as 
wasteful since the speculator acquires information solely for the purpose of 
redistribution, instead of increasing aggregate welfare).  
 70 When parties trade securities they reveal information to each other and 
third parties. See JACK HIRSHLEIFER & JOHN G. RILEY, THE ANALYTICS OF 
UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION 278-92 (1992) (discussing role of unintentional 
information leakage due to market transactions); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. 
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 573-74 (1984) 
(discussing trade decoding and information leakage from informed traders to 
uninformed ones). 
 71 See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, in 
INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 77, 86 (1948) (arguing that the price system 
allows individuals to make the right decisions by merely acting on the price, through 
which “only the most essential information is passed on and passed on only to those 
concerned”). 
 72 See Gorton, supra note 65, at 30-37 (describing collapse of subprime and 
repo markets); Amir E. Khandani & Andrew W. Lo, What Happened to the Quants in 
August 2007? Evidence from Factors and Transaction Data, 14 J. FIN. MARKETS 1, 2-3 
(2011) (describing the large losses experienced by hedge funds using quantitative 
trading strategies (quant funds) in August 2007); U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND 
REGULATION 38-39 (2009) [hereinafter DEP’T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY 
REFORM], available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf 
(describing run on money market). 
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securities that were significantly overvalued, worthless,73 or 
difficult to understand,74 and, ultimately, to the accumulation of 
toxic assets on the balance sheets of financial institutions.75  
B. The Quest for Complete Markets 
Of the factors that led to the proliferation of 
transactions in the period leading to the Great Recession—
excessive hedging—may at first glance appear to be the most 
benign. However, one can make a strong case that the 
incessant quest for the hedge, for insurance and the 
reallocation of risk, was what led to the proliferation of new, 
highly complex derivative securities, and eventually to self-
dealing, fraud, and excessive speculation. To see why this is the 
case, we must examine how derivative securities help make 
markets more complete. 
Financial derivatives act as “state-contingent securities”: 
they help actors make investment decisions that take into 
account both uncertainty76 and time. Kenneth Arrow and Gerard 
Debreu developed a model of pure state-contingent securities77 in 
which actors are able to effectively hedge for all possible risks,78 
                                                
 73 See, e.g., Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Goldman Sachs to Pay 
Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO (July 
15, 201), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-123.htm. 
 74 See DEP’T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 72, 
at 2 (discussing the lack of transparency of complex financial derivatives). 
 75 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REPORT ON THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF 
PROGRAM (Oct. 11, 2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ 
attachments/TARP10-2012_0.pdf (providing an overview of the toxic assets held by 
financial institutions who participated in the TARP program).  
 76 The most common way to model uncertainty is to posit that at any one 
point in time, the environment is in a particular state, reflecting a set of properties 
true to the environment at that time. See KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF 
ORGANIZATION 33-34 (1974) (stating that a decision-maker will “consider the world to 
be in one or another of a range of states,” where a state of the world is “a description 
which is complete for all relevant purposes”). 
 77 See Kenneth J. Arrow, The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of 
Risk-Bearing, 31 REV. ECON. STUD. 91, 92-94 (1964) (originally published in French, in 
1953). The economist Gerard Debreu also played a critical part in developing the state-
contingent claim theory, and extending it. See GERARD DEBREU, THEORY OF VALUE: AN 
AXIOMATIC ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM 98-102 (1959).  
 78 To see this, suppose that Anne is trying to make an intertemporal decision, 
in which she has to choose to invest $100 that will produce an uncertain set of payoffs 
in future periods. And suppose further that, for each future period, the possible states 
of the world can be partitioned into mutually exclusive states and that, for each of 
these possible states, Anne knows the expected payoffs that will result. A pure state-
contingent security, introduced by Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu, pays one unit 
(for example, $1) if an event occurs and zero if it does not. If, at the time of making her 
decision, Anne knew the value of each of these state-contingent securities, then she 
would calculate the value of making that $100 by taking the sum of the expected 
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but with a catch: in order to work one must create and 
implement a state-contingent security for each possible state 
of the world.79 Only then, when markets are “complete,” is it 
possible to fully allocate risk in a Pareto optimal manner.80 
With this in mind,81 financial theorists82 and practitioners83 set 
out to design and market state-contingent securities. In 
accepting the Nobel Prize for economics, Robert Merton 
provided the best possible summary of the marriage of Arrow 
and financial innovation: 
During the last 25 years, finance theory has been a good predictor of 
future changes in finance practice. That is, when theory seems to 
suggest that something “should be there” and it isn’t, practice has 
evolved so that it is. The “pure” securities developed by Kenneth J. 
Arrow . . . that so clearly explain the theoretical function of financial 
instruments in risk bearing were nowhere to be found in the real 
world until the broad development of the options and derivative-
security markets. It is now routine for financial engineers to 
disaggregate the cash flows of various securities into their elemental 
Arrow-security component parts and then to reaggregate them to 
create securities with new patterns of cash flows.84  
The proliferation of derivative securities can thus be 
explained, at least in part, as an attempt to create securities 
that come closer to the state-contingent securities posited by 
  
returns for each state of the world. The expected return will be $0 if the state does not 
occur, and the expected return will equal expected value ($1 × Expected Value) if the 
state does occur. Thus, state-contingent securities allow Anne to value investments 
based on each possible states of the occurring in each future period.  
 79 See ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 709 (1995) 
(describing an incomplete market as one in which there are fewer tradable assets than 
there are states of the world); see also Ross, supra note 67, at 75 (stating that Arrow’s 
theory of state-contingent securities “brought the recognition that an inadequate 
number of markets in contingent claims would be a source of inefficiency”). 
 80 See MAS-COLLEL ET AL., supra note 79, at 692 (stating that if the Arrow-
Debreu conditions of the existence and tradability of state-contingent securities hold, 
then, at equilibrium, one would have “an efficient allocation of risk”). 
 81 See Douglas T. Breeden & Robert H. Litzenberger, Prices of State-
Contingent Claims Implicit in Option Prices, 51 J. BUS. 621, 621 (1978) (stating that 
the Arrow-Debreu, state-contingent model is “one of the most general frameworks 
available for the theory of finance under uncertainty”). 
 82 See Ross, supra note 67, at 75 (stating that Arrow’s theory of state-
contingent securities “brought the recognition that an inadequate number of markets 
in contingent claims would be a source of inefficiency.”). 
 83 See Merton, supra note 66, at 28-32 (describing role of financial 
institutions in financial innovation, including customizing and designing securities to 
help customers engage in hedging activities). 
 84 Robert C. Merton, Applications of Option-Pricing Theory: Twenty-Five 
Years Later, 88 AMER. ECON. REV. 323, 341 n.31 (1998). Compare with Ross, supra note 67, 
at 76 (writing in 1976, trying to address why there was such a paucity of Arrow securities). 
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Arrow and Debreu.85 Standard equity and debt securities were 
too coarse; their value depended on too many contingencies, 
and, thus too many “intermingled” possible states of the world. 
The financial engineering project described and 
endorsed by Merton86 involved partitioning securities into 
different components, each coming closer to the ideal Arrow-
Debreu security: one whose value depended on whether a 
particular state of the world came to pass on a particular date.87 
Stand-alone transactions involving coarse securities were each 
divided into multiple transactions. This led to a proliferation of 
transactions involving a larger number of parties. Some of these 
transactions were subsequently combined into composite 
derivative securities. This disaggregation–reaggregation process 
increased the level of complexity,88 and over time made it 
increasingly difficult to describe, understand, and properly 
value the securities.89 The greater the complexity, the greater 
the transaction costs90 of implementing and monitoring state-
contingent securities.91 
                                                
 85 See Ross supra note 67, at 76 (discussing possibility of using derivative 
products to make contingent-state markets more complete). 
 86 See Robert C. Merton, Financial Intermediation in the Continuous Time 
Model, in CONTINUOUS TIME FINANCE 370 (1992) (providing a sustained defense of 
financial engineering, notwithstanding the fact that the “products” that they produce 
mimic “high-speed passenger trains”: socially beneficial but open to a few derailings 
before all of the kinks are worked out). 
 87 See id. (stating that the “overriding theme of the theory has financial 
innovation as the engine driving the financial system on its prospective journey to 
efficiency and complete markets”). 
 88 A complex system is “one made up of a large number of parts that have 
many interactions,” where complexity will increase whenever, given “the properties of 
the parts and the laws of their interaction, it is not a trivial matter to infer the 
properties of the whole.” See HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL 183-
84, 207 (3d ed. 1996).  
 89 See DEP’T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, supra note 72, 
at 2 (discussing the use of complex financial products in the period leading up to the 
Great Recession). Asset-backed securities pose particular challenges because the same 
piece of collateral is often used to secure the obligations of multiple parties (tranching) 
or as security in multiple transactions (pyramiding). See John Geanakoplos, Liquidity, 
Default, and Crashes: Endogenous Contracts in General Equilibrium, in II ADVANCES 
IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS APPLICATIONS: THEORY AND APPLICATION: EIGHTH 
WORLD CONGRESS 170, 173-74 (Mathias Dewatripont et al. eds., 2003) (defining 
tranching and pyramiding). 
 90 A “transaction cost” is the cost of carrying out a transaction, including the 
costs of identifying valuable transactions and suitable parties, foreseeing contingencies 
and potential conflicts, bargaining, and drafting contracts. See HART, supra note 9, at 
23 (emphasizing transaction costs due to foreseeing future contingencies, bargaining, 
and drafting contracts that a third-party enforcer, such as a court, will be able to 
interpret and determine whether it has been breached); Luca Anderlini & Leonardo 
Felli, Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature, Q.J. ECON. 1085 
(1994) (describing the computational intractability problems when trying to write 
complete contracts); Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi, Rigidity, Discretion and 
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C. n-Contracts Financial Transactions 
We must now get a better sense of the fragmentation of 
financial transactions. Fragmentation occurs when a single 
transaction is partitioned into n number of subtransactions, 
where each subtransaction has its own contract—an n-
contracts-transaction. To do this we first need to settle on a 
definition of transactions. As a general matter, a transaction 
involves the transfer of a good, service, or security.92 This 
definition is useful when considering the general problem of 
transaction-cost economics. However, we are concerned with the 
following questions. How does one determine the optimal 
number of parties that should be involved in a transaction? For 
example, given a transaction, M, for the sale of a good, service, 
or security, should that transaction involve only the buyer and 
seller, or should other parties be involved? Should it be carried 
out through one global transaction, M, or should it be 
partitioned into n number of subtransactions?  
In order to answer these questions, we must use a more 
precise definition of party, transaction, and subtransaction. 
Two parties participate in a transaction if they have rights 
and/or obligations in relation to each other that are either 
enforceable in a court—as when the parties are in privity of 
contract—or indirectly enforceable through reputational 
constraints. A transaction may involve n number of 
subtransactions (where n may equal 1). As a general matter, 
then, a transaction can be defined as a “relationship” between 
two or more parties to accomplish a goal related to the 
purchase or sale of a good, service, or security.  
While these definitions are intentionally fuzzy, they will 
serve for the purposes of this article. Our principal goal is to 
examine the fragmentation of securities transactions that arises 
from the disaggregation and reaggregation of relationships, as 
  
the Costs of Writing Contracts, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 798 (2002) (setting forth detailed 
theory of the effect of writing costs on contract incompleteness). 
 91 In fact transaction costs are a major obstacle to achieving complete 
markets. See Merton, supra note 86, at 431-32 (discussing role of transaction costs in 
connection with state-contingent securities and discussing role of financial 
intermediaries in reducing transaction cost of producing and trading state-contingent 
securities); Kenneth J. Arrow & Frank Hahn, Notes on Sequence Economies, 
Transaction Costs, and Uncertainty, 86 J. ECON. THEORY 203, 213 (1999) (discussing 
general problem of “missing securities” and role played by transaction costs). 
 92 See PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION, & 
EFFICIENCY 21 (1992) (describing a “transaction” as “the most fundamental unit of 
analysis in economic organization theory” and defining it as “the transfer of goods or 
services from one individual to another”). 
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described by Merton in the excerpt quoted above.93 At the same 
time, this article aims to develop an account of the social costs 
created by this disaggregation–reaggragation process. 
Ultimately, a more precise definition must account for the 
boundary between transactions and subtransactions.  
This article argues that the question of whether a 
transaction should be internalized into a single contract or 
partitioned into n number of subtransactions (each with its 
own contract) is analogous to the question raised by Ronald 
Coase in The Nature of the Firm: when should a transaction be 
internalized within a firm and when should it be carried out 
externally through transactions with other market 
participants?94 A party who wants to achieve a particular goal 
via a transaction will either carry it out within one global 
transaction, M, or subdivide it into two or more subtransactions. 
It will internalize the transaction within M only when the 
transaction costs of doing so are lower than achieving that 
same transactional goal via two or more subtransactions.95  
For example, a transaction where A would lend money 
to C could be partitioned into two subtransactions: one where A 
lends money to B, a bank, and B lends money to C. These 
initial transactions can be further partitioned. For example, G 
could insure A’s deposits just as the FDIC does for bank 
deposits. And C, who has borrowed money from the bank, could 
use the loan to invest in E. A similar process occurs when an 
equity fund, hedge fund, or venture capital firm borrows funds 
and uses them to make further investments. 
Similarly, a transaction where C borrows money from B 
could be partitioned by having C borrow through n-debt 
transactions with investors, who purchase debt securities. C 
may hire a financial intermediary to act as an underwriter for 
the issuance of those securities. The underwriter would then 
act as agent for the ultimate purchasers. In turn, the company 
                                                
 93 See supra note 85. 
 94 Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND 
THE LAW (1988). 
 95 See id. at 43 (arguing that transactions will be carried out within the firm 
when the transaction costs of doing so are lower than carrying them out through 
market transactions); see also Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford & Armen Alchian, 
Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 
J. L & ECON. 297 (1978) (examining boundary between firm and markets, in contexts 
where one party’s investment in the transaction can lead to opportunistic behavior by 
other party); HART, supra note 9, at 29-55 (formal analysis of decision of whether to 
internalize productions, and general difficulties of delineating where a firm ends and 
market begins). 
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and the purchasers would enter into a transaction with an 
indenture trustee. 
III. A THEORY OF “TRANSITIVE-RISK” CONTRACTS  
This part develops a new theory of interconnected 
financial institutions and interconnected contracts. It begins by 
analyzing the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that are relevant 
to the interconnectedness of financial institutions. It then sets 
forth the theory of transitive-risk contracts. The theory offers a 
bottom-up approach to understanding interconnectedness.  
A. The Dodd-Frank Act and the Interconnectedness of 
Financial Institutions 
One stated goal of the Dodd-Frank Act96 is to strengthen 
the supervision of all large, complex financial organizations,97 
including subjecting them to “more stringent capital and 
liquidity standards”98 and requiring financial regulators to 
continually monitor financial markets and the contracts 
market participants use to hedge risks and engage in 
speculation.99 The Financial Stability Oversight Council 
(Council)100 is required to “monitor the financial services 
marketplace in order to identify potential threats to the 
financial stability of the United States”;101 to take into account 
“the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, 
and mix of the activities”102 of a nonbank financial institution 
when determining whether the institution should be subject to 
                                                
 96 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 7 U.S.C., 
12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., and 31 U.S.C.). 
 97 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 2 (2010); see also Dodd-Frank Act § 102(a)(1), 
(a)(4)(A) (defining “bank holding company” and “foreign nonbank financial company,” 
respectively); id. § 102(a)(4)(D) (defining “nonbank financial company supervised by the 
Board of Governors” as a nonbank financial company that the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council has determined shall be supervised by the Board of Governors); id. 
§ 102(a)(7) (delegating to the Federal Reserve Board the authority to define “significant 
nonbank financial companies” and “significant bank holding companies”). 
 98 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 3 (summarizing the testimony of Federal Reserve 
Board Chairman Ben Bernanke to the Banking Committee on July 22, 2009). 
 99 See Dodd-Frank Act, Title VII, Subtitle A—Regulation of Over-the-Counter 
Swap Markets; Subtitle B—Regulation of Security-Based Swap Markets; Title VIII—
Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Supervision; Title IX, Subtitle D—Improvements to 
the Asset-Backed Securitization Process. 
 100 See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 111-112 (establishing the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council and setting forth authority). 
 101 Id. § 112(a)(2)(C). 
 102 Id. § 113(a)(2)(G). 
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enhanced supervision by the Federal Reserve;103 and to 
determine whether it should restrict an institution’s ability to 
offer particular financial products or to require the institution 
to terminate risky activities (or, alternatively, to impose 
conditions on the manner in which it carries them out).104 
This is a difficult task, even in the best possible 
scenario, an idealized world in which regulators and regulated 
parties have identical interests and combine forces to identify 
and resolve problems, in a spirit of cooperation. The task, 
however, becomes increasingly difficult in a regulatory context, 
such as that of modern financial markets, in which financial 
institutions compete with each other to identify and exploit 
legal loopholes, and where the avant-garde financial engineer 
gets compensated more handsomely than the “retro-garde” risk 
manager. But even in the idealized regulatory context, the 
Council and Federal Reserve would need to identify growing 
system-wide risks in a timely fashion. And once they have done 
that, they must find and implement a solution before a system-
wide problem has tipped over into systemic risk, and triggered 
a financial crisis.  
The financial health of an individual financial 
institution can change quickly, insidiously, and sometimes 
catastrophically, as in the case of a bank run. New financial 
contracts (or types of transactions) that work perfectly under 
normal parameters, or when used sparingly, can change 
quickly into toxic assets due to unforeseeable contingencies. 
Real-time governance by regulators of individual financial 
institutions and financial contracts is a difficult, complex 
undertaking; real-time governance of financial systems—an 
agglomeration of institutions and financial contracts—is 
exponentially more difficult. And not just for regulators, but for 
shareholders, creditors, managers, and counterparties in 
financial contracts.  
It follows that the macroprudential oversight that the 
Council and Federal Reserve are charged with is a far more 
daunting task than the microprudential (single-institution) 
approach under traditional banking regulations. The first step 
in achieving real-time macroprudential regulation is that of 
gathering large amounts of information, processing it 
(including aggregating it into manageable data sets), testing it, 
                                                
 103 See id. § 113(a)(1) (allowing the Council to vote to require enhanced 
supervision with Federal Reserve of U.S. nonbank financial institutions). 
 104 See id. § 121(a). 
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analyzing the results, and transferring them to the right 
regulator, in a usable format, so that it can understand and use 
them, before the information has become stale.105 Again, the 
task is not an easy one: information about dynamic 
environments, such as financial markets, will remain fresh—
accurate and usable—for much shorter periods than that about 
more static environments in other industries. To help in this 
endeavor, Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act creates a new Office of 
Financial Research.106  
Of critical importance for purposes of this article is the 
question of how one goes about characterizing interconnections 
between financial institutions. The Council has defined 
“interconnectedness” of financial institutions to mean the 
“direct or indirect linkages . . . that may be conduits for the 
transmission of the effects” of a financial institution’s “material 
financial distress or activities.”107 But there is still no adequate 
account of how direct and indirect linkages between financial 
institutions and financial contracts can lead to the spillover of 
counterparty risk discussed below. Moreover, and somewhat 
problematically, Dodd-Frank draws a relatively sharp 
distinction between the regulation of systemically important 
financial institutions,108 financial contracts and financial 
markets,109 and clearing and settlement facilities.110  
B. Transitive-Risk Contracts 
A transitive-risk contract relationship involves two or 
more contracts that are linked together by the participation of 
a common party, which I will refer to as the conduit. As a 
general matter, a transitive relation between the members of a 
set, A, B, and C, meets the following condition: if A and B are 
in relation R to each other, and B and C are in a relation R, 
                                                
 105 See Ben Kao et al., Updates and View Maintenance in Soft Real-Time 
Database Systems, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 8TH ACM INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT (CIKM) 300, 300-01 (1999) 
(distinguishing between “transaction timeliness”—how fast a system carries out a 
requested transaction—and data “timeliness”—which refers to the relative freshness or 
staleness of data). 
 106 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 151-156. 
 107 Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank 
Financial Companies, 76 Fed. Reg. 64264, 64279 (proposed Oct. 18, 2011) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. tit. 1310). 
 108 See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 113, 115, 161-176 and Title II.  
 109 See id. Title VII. 
 110 See id. Title VIII. 
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then A and C are also in a relation R to each other.111 In the 
case of transitive-risk contracting, both A and B and B and C 
are in contractual relationships with each other. We can thus 
say that A and C are in an indirect contracting relationship, 
through B, who acts as the conduit. The conduit brings 
together two external parties within a common contracting 
sphere, where they can influence the other’s welfare, for better 
or worse. The conduit, in short, is a vehicle through which the 
two external parties can transmit positive and negative 
externalities to each other. Whenever two parties enter into a 
contract, their actions under the contract may create costs or 
benefits to third parties who are not party to the contract.112 For 
example, a contract between a homeowner and a contractor to 
effectuate extensive renovations to the outside of her home may 
create negative externalities to her neighbors during the 
renovations, but it may also produce positive externalities to 
the extent it increases neighboring property values. This 
standard type of externality problem has received a large 
amount of attention in the legal literature.113 However, this 
article focuses not on general externality problems but instead 
on the way that one particular class of externalities—contract 
risks—are created and transferred in multiparty transactions.  
So far we have assumed that the transitive-risk 
relationships involve three parties, but they can involve more 
parties. For example, suppose a company has 100 short-term 
and 10 long-term creditors. One could model this relationship 
as involving 110 creditors, all linked together by the 
corporation (the conduit). Or, depending on the context, we 
could model it as a three-party relationship, with the short-
term and long-term creditors, as a group, linked together by 
the corporation. One would take the first approach if, for 
example, one were concerned with the way that cross-default 
provisions link all the creditors together. One would take the 
second approach, however, if one were concerned about the 
counterparty risks borne by long-term creditors in the event 
                                                
 111 See, e.g., Edi Karni & David Schmeidler, Utility Theory with Uncertainty, 
in IV HANDBOOK OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 1763, 1766 (W. Hildenbrand & H. 
Sonnenschein, eds. 1991) (defining a transitive relation as one in which, given a binary 
relation ≥ , on a set A, the relation is transitive, if for all a, b, and c, in A, if a ≥ b & b ≥ 
c, then a ≥ c). 
 112 See James M. Buchanan & William Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 
ECONOMICA 371, 371 (1962) (defining externality). 
 113 For an overview of the standard externality theory see RICHARD CORNES & 
TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 39-
142 (2d ed. 1996). 
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short-term creditors, as a group, were to withdraw their 
financing, increase the interest rate of their loans, or require 
the corporation to pledge additional collateral. All other things 
being equal, the greater the number of simple contracts 
combined into a composite, transitive-risk contract, the greater 
the complexity and thus, time, it would take parties to 
understand the myriad interconnections.  
C. Transitive Counterparty Risk 
Transitive-risk contract relationships raise a number of 
important informational problems that might be overlooked if 
one failed to fully account for the role the conduit party plays in 
transmitting and obscuring information about the various 
external parties. An external party may not know about the 
existence of other external parties, and even if they know they 
exist, they may not know their identity or have the capacity to 
observe their behavior. For example, as we will see below, 
while depositors know that their collective contractual 
relationships with a bank binds them together in a special way, 
they also know that they lack complete information about each 
of their private relationships with the bank. These two facts 
can increase the likelihood of a bank run. Finally, in some 
instances, confidentiality and anonymity make all of the 
parties better off.114  
It is helpful to specify the various ways in which 
counterparty risks can be transmitted through transitive-risk 
contracting relationships. First, suppose that A and B enter 
into a contract in which they are both subject to a counterparty 
risk vis-à-vis the other, and B and C enter into an analogous 
contract in which they both bear counterparty risks. It follows 
that A and C are in a transitive-risk relationship, where B is a 
conduit for the transmission of counterparty risks. Suppose 
that A breaches on its contract with B. In that instance, C’s 
counterparty risk will increase due to the greater likelihood 
that B may need to breach its contract with C. A breach by C 
could increase A’s counterparty risk in the same manner. 
                                                
 114 A transaction between an external party and the conduit is confidential 
vis-à-vis another external party if that party is not aware of the transaction. On the 
other hand, in an anonymous transaction, the external party knows that the conduit 
has entered into a transaction with another external party but does not know the 
identity of that party. See Marc Rennhard et al., An Architecture for an Anonymity 
Network, 2001 IEEE 165, 166 (developing distinction between confidentiality and 
anonymity in the context of network security protocols). 
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Second, suppose there are three contracts, each 
involving one-sided counterparty risks: (1) A to B; (2) B to C; 
and (3) C to D. If A breaches its contract with B, both C and D 
may be negatively affected.  
 
 
 
This last example could include a larger number of 
parties linked through a series of transitive-risk contracts. This 
is important because the decisional complexity facing the 
parties is likely to increase with each additional link in a 
transitive-risk contracting chain, and a greater amount of 
information is likely to be lost along the way.  
IV. TRANSITIVE-RISK CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 
Transitive-risk contracts are particularly important in 
financial transactions because of the frequent involvement of 
financial institutions acting as financial intermediaries.115 This 
part analyzes the role of transitive-risk contracts in a number 
of contexts involving financial institutions. It begins by 
examining transitive-risk contracts in commercial banking, 
and identifies transitive counterparty risks flowing from 
depositors to borrowers and vice versa, as well as transitive 
risks among depositors. The following section extends the 
general insights to show how transitive counterparty risks can 
fuel bank panics and financial contagion. The part continues by 
                                                
 115 Because of the coordination problems involved in many types of financial 
intermediation contexts, it is useful to model financial intermediation relationship as a 
multi-party relationship, as opposed to two or more independent financial contracts 
tied together by the fact that there is a common intermediary involved. See Martin F. 
Hellwig, Financial Intermediation and Risk Aversion, 67 REV. ECON. STUD. 719, 719-20 
(2000) (arguing that we should model intermediation as a relation between 
intermediaries, the investors providing the funds and the firms making use of these 
intermediated funds, and complaining that many studies fail to approach the two sets 
of financial contracts in a holistic fashion). 
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analyzing transitive-risk contracts in repo transactions. In 
doing so it identifies transitive counterparty risks among repo 
borrowers as well as transitive risks flowing from the 
financiers of repo lenders to repo borrowers and vice versa. The 
part then looks at transitive counterparty risks in 
securitization transactions. It then provides a more general 
account of how transitive-risk contracts can exacerbate 
liquidity problems among financial institutions. The last 
section analyzes transitive counterparty risks in derivative 
contracting contexts.  
A. Transitive-Risk Contracts Between Depositors, a Bank, 
and the Bank’s Borrowers  
Commercial banks finance their operations primarily by 
borrowing from their depositors on a short-term basis. A 
demand deposit agreement is structured so deposits will roll 
over automatically, daily, until the depositor terminates all or 
part of the loan by making a withdrawal.116 A bank aggregates 
the depositors’ funds, keeps some on reserve to satisfy 
anticipated withdrawals, and lends the rest. While a bank can 
choose the maturity of its loans to third parties, it cannot 
demand early repayment, unless the borrower has defaulted.117  
This tripartite relationship between banks, its short-
term lenders (the depositors), and its long-term borrowers 
exposes a bank to the maturity mismatch problem discussed in 
Part I. This section examines that problem in greater detail, 
using the transitive-risk contract theory developed in Part III. 
It begins by analyzing the transitive counterparty risk 
associated with the relationship between depositors and 
borrowers. A maturity-mismatch problem can arise if a 
sufficient number of depositors decide to make withdrawals at 
the same time, or whenever a large enough group of borrowers 
default on their obligations to the bank within a short period of 
time. In other words, a bank can become insolvent or face a 
liquidity problem whenever its loan portfolio loses a sufficient 
                                                
 116 See Charles W. Calomiris & Charles M. Kahn, The Role of Demandable 
Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements, in CREDIT, INTERMEDIATION, AND 
THE MACROECONOMY: MODELS AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 31, at 36-41 (providing 
an overview of demand deposits and their role in providing liquidity to depositors). 
 117 Some loan agreements will include “insecurity clauses” that allow banks to 
accelerate payment of the principal and interest due, but if the debt is secured by 
collateral subject to Article 9 of the UCC, then the acceleration will be allowed if the 
creditor “in good faith believes that the prospect of payment or performance is 
impaired.” See UCC § 1-309 (2011).  
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amount of value or if depositors and other lenders refuse to roll 
over their loans. The section then examines the transfer of 
transitive counterparty risk among depositors. 
1. Transitive-Risk Contracts Between Depositors and 
Borrowers, with the Bank as Conduit  
In order to manage its liquidity risks, a bank must 
predict the expected inflow and outflow of deposits and loan 
proceeds. A bank’s credit risk refers to the likelihood that the 
expected returns from its loan portfolio will fail to materialize 
due to borrowers’ defaults.118 In order to properly account for it, 
a bank must anticipate outside shocks that could negatively 
impact its borrower base—both current and potential 
borrowers. These include shifts in the business cycle119 and 
declines in the value of collateral, such as real estate, 
equipment, securities, and inventory.120  
The demand deposit contracts between depositors and a 
bank create a positive externality for borrowers, given that it is 
the depositors’ cash that funds the loan contracts. In a similar 
fashion, loan agreements create a positive externality for 
depositors: the bank will use a portion of the interest from 
these loans to pay depositors interest on their accounts.  
 
 
 
But this transitive relation can also lead to the transfer 
of counterparty risk from borrowers to depositors and vice 
versa, with the bank, again, acting as the conduit. If enough 
borrowers default on their loans or take their business to 
another institution, the value of the bank’s assets and its cash 
                                                
 118 See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY (OCC), ASSET SECURITIZATION: 
COMPTROLLERS HANDBOOK 37 (Nov. 1997) (defining credit risk as the “risk to earnings 
or capital arising from an obligor’s failure to meet the terms of any contract with the 
bank or otherwise to perform as agreed”). 
 119 See Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, Cyclical Implications of The Basel 
II Capital Standards, ECON. PERSPECTIVES 18, 21 (1st Q., 2004) (arguing that instead 
of setting capital requirements based on a single, static risk curve, regulators should 
instead use “a family of point-in-time risk curves, with each curve corresponding . . . to 
different macroeconomic conditions”).  
 120 See Mark H. Adelson & David P. Jacobs, The Subprime Problem; Causes 
and Lessons, 14 J. STRUCTURED FIN. 12 (2008).  
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flows would be negatively affected. This, in turn, would 
increase the counterparty risk faced by depositors, who may be 
unable to withdraw their funds if the bank becomes insolvent 
or experiences a liquidity problem. At the same time, if enough 
depositors withdraw their funds, they create a transitive 
counterparty risk for borrowers, to the extent that it leads the 
bank to breach commitments on revolving loan agreements121 or 
to cut back on its lending activities, thereby affecting borrowers 
with more short-term loans who cannot renew them.122 
2. Transitive-Risk Contracts Among Depositors, with 
the Bank as Conduit  
As we just saw, each depositor is in a contractual 
relationship with the bank and thus is subject to the risk that 
the bank will breach its obligation to return the funds on 
demand. In addition, each depositor is in a transitive-risk 
relationship with each other depositor, with the bank as a 
conduit. This “hub-and-spoke” transitive contracting 
relationship among depositors can lead to the transfer of 
positive externalities as well as counterparty risk.  
 
 
 
Whenever a depositor rolls over its deposits for an 
additional period, it provides a positive externality to other 
depositors; if the other depositors do the same, they all benefit 
from continuing the status quo equilibrium. If, on the other 
hand, a depositor closes its account it creates a counterparty 
risk for other depositors; while this risk may be small if only a 
handful of depositors withdraw their funds, it can over time 
increase in magnitude, given the transitive-risk relationship 
between depositors and borrowers. As depositors withdraw 
funds, a bank will have to cut-back on its lending activities or 
make less profitable short-term loans. This in turn can lead a 
bank to reduce the interest that it pays on its deposit accounts, 
which can increase the likelihood that depositors will move 
                                                
 121 In a revolving loan agreement, a bank agrees to lend funds to a borrower 
whenever the borrower chooses to draw down on the loan. 
 122 See supra note 53.  
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their funds to another bank. These feedback loops play an 
important role in financial contracts involving financial 
intermediaries; the transitive-risk contracting model allows us 
to bring them to the foreground and provides a 
straightforward, intuitive way of identifying the types of 
relationships in which transitive counterparty risks can 
produce a quickly destructive transitive-risk-feedback loop. A 
bank run is one such transitive-loop. 
A bank run occurs whenever depositors suddenly 
withdraw their funds based on a belief that, if they delay, the 
bank will run out of cash.123 As a general matter, a bank run 
will occur whenever a sufficiently large number of depositors124 
believes that the bank is in financial trouble due to a reduction 
in liquidity, a deterioration of its loan portfolio, or the 
possibility that the bank is otherwise in danger of becoming 
insolvent.125 But what ultimately causes bank runs is the fact 
that depositors are in a transitive-risk relationship with each 
other, they know about the relationship, and they have 
incomplete information about why some depositors have chosen 
                                                
 123 See Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 16, at 401 (defining a bank run as a 
situation in which “depositors rush to withdraw their deposits because they expect the 
bank to fail”). Bank runs are often triggered by depositors’ herding behavior. For 
example, suppose a bank has three depositors. Depositor 1 withdraws her money from 
the bank. Depositor 2, after observing this, follows suit, believing that Depositor 1 
acted on private information that the bank was insolvent. Now Depositor 3, after 
observing the behavior of the first two depositors, is even more likely to believe they 
acted on the basis of useful private information about the bank’s financial condition. 
Depositor 2 and Depositor 3, however, do not know whether Depositor 1 withdrew 
funds because it needed cash—for example, because it needed to pay its taxes—or 
because it knew the bank was in financial trouble. This informational asymmetry 
between depositors can lead to inefficient herding, whereby otherwise healthy banks 
suffer bank runs. A bank run might be triggered when uninformed depositors observe 
longer-than-usual lines of depositors withdrawing funds or when false rumors begin 
circulating that a bank is facing financial trouble. See V.V. Chari & Ravi Jagannathan, 
Banking Panics, Information, and Rational Expectations Equilibrium, in CREDIT, 
INTERMEDIATION, AND THE MACROECONOMY: MODELS AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 
31, at 265-79 (offering a bank run model in which a sufficiently large set of individuals 
withdraw at the same time for private reasons not necessarily related, and these 
withdrawers are observed by others that infer that those withdrawals are due to 
liquidity problems in that bank). 
 124 To the extent that a sophisticated depositor’s funds comprise a sufficiently 
large portion of a bank’s deposit, the possibility of a bank run may depend on the 
decision of the large depositor to stay put or pull its funds out of the bank. See TIROLE, 
supra note 7, at 456 (stating that if large depositors are patient then bank runs may be 
averted, even if small depositors begin to withdraw funds).  
 125 See Charles J. Jacklin & Sudipto Bhattacharya, Distinguishing Panics and 
Information-Based Bank Runs: Welfare and Policy Implications, 96 J. POL ECON. 568 (1988).  
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to withdraw their funds.126 Bank withdrawals occur on a “first-
come, first-served” basis, which creates a race to the withdrawal 
window.127 As a result, if a depositor has any doubt regarding 
whether a bank run is about to begin or has already begun, she 
has ample incentive to withdraw her money immediately instead 
of trying to ascertain the motives of other depositors or to make 
sense of the bank’s complex financial condition.  
Bank runs could be avoided altogether by bringing in an 
additional counterparty to insure deposits—such as the 
FDIC—or replacing the fractional reserve system with a 
system in which banks must keep 100 percent of their deposits 
on reserve.128 Of course, such a bank would have to limit its 
business to “storing” deposits or would need to raise capital from 
other sources, such as by issuing equity or long-term debt.129  
The transitive-risk contract model allows us to better 
understand the relationship between these two approaches. In 
the case of an outside insurer, one is merely replacing one type 
of transitive-risk relationship with another. The FDIC now 
stands in the shoes of depositors, so it will be in a transitive 
relationship with the bank’s borrowers. As such the bank will 
act as a conduit to transfer counterparty risks between the 
FDIC and borrowers: if borrowers default on their loans, 
depositors may trigger a bank run, and the FDIC will bear the 
loss. Similarly, if the FDIC determines that the bank should 
keep higher reserves and thus cut back on its lending 
activities, the bank’s borrowers would be affected. Under the 
second approach, in which the bank is required to keep 100 
percent of deposits on reserve, one is merely severing the 
transitive counterparty risk relationship between depositors 
and borrowers, but creating a functionally equivalent transitive 
relationship between borrowers and the holders of the bank’s 
equity and debt securities. Both types of solutions to bank runs 
are just ways of changing the identity of the parties who are in 
                                                
 126 See BRUNNERMEIER, supra note 63, at 28 (drawing distinction between 
traders who sell assets due to own private reasons and those who sell for common 
reasons, such as private information that the assets are over-valued).  
 127 See Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 16, at 403 (model in which bank run 
occurs due to liquid liabilities and illiquid assets and the sequential nature in which 
depositors must withdraw funds; depositors will have an incentive to be the first to withdraw). 
 128 See Jean-Charles Rochet, Bank Runs and Financial Crises: A Discussion, 
in CREDIT, INTERMEDIATION, AND THE MACROECONOMY supra note 31, at 324-25 (arguing 
that fractional reserve system is principal reason for general fragility of banks).  
 129 See Biagio Bossone, Should Banks Be Narrowed? (Levy Institute Working 
Paper No. 354), available at http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp354.pdf (discussing 
the concept of “narrow banks” which do not rely on depositors’ funds).  
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a transitive contracting relationship with each other. The 
transitive-risk contracting model, therefore, offers a deeper 
account of bank runs and potential policy solutions. As we will 
see in the rest of the article, it also helps us to better 
understand the dynamics of bank panics, financial contagion, 
and “runs” in shadow banks.  
B. Bank Panics and Financial Contagion 
A bank panic occurs when the failure of one bank leads 
to the failure of a large number of banks, possibly affecting the 
whole industry;130 problems within the banking system can spill 
over to other financial institutions, financial markets, and 
currency markets (problems within any of those markets can 
also spread to other parts of the financial system). This sort of 
intra-system spillover comes under the rubric of financial 
contagion.131 Both bank panics and financial contagion can be 
explained using the transitive-risk contracting model.  
Banks are in a transitive contracting relationship with 
each other, through which positive externalities and negative 
counterparty risk gets transmitted. One type of transitive 
contract linkage stems from the fact that banks routinely lend 
money to each other through the interbank lending system.132 
The interbank lending system provides a positive externality to 
those involved, since it allows banks to withstand outside 
shocks or address liquidity needs created by the random ebb 
and flow of deposits and withdrawals.133 At the same time, it 
can act as a conduit for the transfer of transitive counterparty 
risk: financial problems within one or more participating banks 
can lead other banks to hoard cash and cut-back on their 
lending activities.134 This in turn can have a transitive-risk-
                                                
 130 See FREIXAS & ROCHET, supra note 17, at 191-92 (distinguishing between a 
“bank run” affecting one bank and a “bank panic” affecting the whole banking industry). 
 131 See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Financial Contagion, 108 J. POL. 
ECON. 1, 2 (2000) (describing contagion across different parts of financial system). 
 132 See Rochet, supra note 128, at 329-34 (describing linkages through 
interbank lending and payment systems and discussing reasons why these 
interconnections can increase the likelihood of contagion). 
 133 See João F. Cocco, Lending Relationships in the Interbank Market, 18 J. 
FIN. INTERMEDIATION 24, 25-26 (2009) (summarizing literature on use of interbank 
lending to meet liquidity needs). 
 134 See Allen & Gale, Financial Contagion, 3-5 (arguing that interbank 
markets help decrease the probability of individual bank failure, but increases 
likelihood of financial contagion). 
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feedback effect that can lead the whole market to freeze, as it 
did at the beginning of the Great Recession.135  
Depositors in different banks within a financial system 
are in a transitive-risk relationship with each other; these 
interconnections can help explain bank panics. Depositors of 
Bank A could interpret the failure of Bank B in two ways: as a 
problem unique to that bank, or as a problem affecting all 
banks within the system, such as nonperforming loan portfolios 
or a decrease in the value of investment securities.136 If 
depositors conclude that the problem is attributable to system-
wide problems, they will stage bank runs in each of their 
institutions, thereby producing a full-fledged panic.137  
C. Transitive-Risk Contracts in the Repo Market 
1. Repos 
The repo market is a principal source of financing for 
financial institutions; it enables them to raise short-term funds 
by using securities as collateral.138 A repo transaction is 
functionally equivalent to a short-term secured loan. It involves 
two contracts: under the first one, a “lender” purchases, at a 
discount, a security, which will act as a form of “collateral”;139 
under the second contract, the “borrower” agrees to repurchase 
the security, at a price higher than what it sold it to the 
lender.140 The difference between the sale and repurchase prices 
                                                
 135 See Stephen G. Cecchetti, Crisis and Responses: The Federal Reserve in the 
Early Stages of the Financial Crisis, 23 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 51, 57-58 (2009) 
(stating that interbank lending among U.S. banks is $2 trillion and that hoarding of 
funds in this market was one of the triggers of the Great Recession); Jean-Charles 
Rochet & Jean Tirole, Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk, 28 J. MONEY, CREDIT, & 
BANKING 733, 734-35 (1996) (arguing that interbank lending will provide incentive to 
monitor and that this incentive will tend to decrease to the extent that governments 
insure these loans).  
 136 See Philippe Aghion et al., Contagious Bank Failures in a Free Banking 
System, 44 EUR. ECON. REV. 713, 715-17 (2000) (developing a global coordination 
failure model of contagion in which the failure of one bank can lead depositors to 
conclude that failure is due to liquidity problems in banking system as a whole). 
 137 See Rochet, supra note 128, at 328-29 (describing global coordination 
failures in financial markets analogous to a single institution coordination problem). 
 138 See Peter Hordahl & Michael R. King, Developments in Repo Markets 
During the Financial Turmoil, BIS Q. REV. 37, 38-39 (Dec. 2008) (describing basic 
characteristics and uses of repo transactions). 
 139 The collateral may range from relatively safe and liquid securities (such as 
T-bills) to much riskier ones (such as asset-backed securities). 
 140 A repo seller owning a security valued at $1000 can sell it to the repo buyer 
for $900, agreeing to repurchase it at a later date for $1000. The $100 difference 
between the sale and repurchase price is the haircut, equivalent to a cash margin but 
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is equivalent to the interest that would have been paid on a 
standard loan. If the borrower breaches by refusing to 
repurchase the collateral, the lender will sell the collateral.141 
Although this may mitigate the lender’s damages, it still bears 
the risk that the value of the collateral will go down or that it 
will be unable to resell it.  
The repo market represents a principal source of 
secured financing for shadow banks, and it has become an 
increasingly important part of financing for traditional banks, 
as well. In fact, by the end of 2007, the repo market was larger 
than the total assets of the U.S. banking system142 and provided 
a principal source of funds for investment banks, hedge funds, 
and traditional banks. Indeed, in the period leading to the 
Great Recession, U.S. investment banks used the repo market 
for approximately fifty percent of their funding needs.143  
2. Transitive Contracts Among Repo Lenders, and 
Shadow-Bank Runs 
As we have seen, bank runs occur whenever depositors 
stop “rolling over their deposits” en masse. By analogy, a 
shadow-bank run can be defined as the sudden withdrawal of 
short-term financing from a shadow bank. Repo lenders are in 
a transitive contracting relationship with each other, with the 
borrower acting as a conduit. Repo lenders may stop rolling 
over their repos because they believe that the borrower may be 
unable to meet its repurchase obligations or that there has 
been a material decline in the value of the collateral; they may 
  
is, in fact, higher, because the collateral may lose value before the repurchase date. On 
that date, the parties can either settle or roll over the repo.  
 141 The transaction is structured as a sale for bankruptcy purposes. If the 
borrower goes into bankruptcy during the term of the repo, the collateral does not 
become part of the bankruptcy estate, since the lender already owns it. See, e.g., 
William F. Hagerty, IV, Lifting the Cloud of Uncertainty over the Repo Market: 
Characterization of Repos as Separate Purchases and Sales of Securities, 37 VAND. L. 
REV. 401, 409 (1984) (noting that characterizing a repo transaction as a purchase 
rather than a loan protects the collateral from the bankruptcy trustee). This is 
different than if the transaction had been structured as a loan secured by the security. 
See Bankruptcy Code § 559, 11 U.S.C. § 559 (2006) (exempting repos from the 
automatic stay); 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(7) (exempting the applicability of stays to exercise 
of contractual rights by a repo participant). 
 142 See Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run 
on Repo 10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15223, 2009), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15223 (estimating that at the end of 2007, 
the size of the repo market and bank assets was approximately $12 trillion and $10 
trillion, respectively).  
 143 See Hördhal & King, supra note 137, at 38. 
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also stop rolling over a repo if they themselves are experiencing 
a liquidity shortage or other financial problem. As in the case of 
depositors, a repo lender who sees a second lender failing to 
renew its repo may not know if it is due to private information 
that it has about the borrower or because of its own financial 
needs. This informational asymmetry between repo lenders can 
lead to a run on a borrower.  
The transitive-contracting problem is more complex in 
repos than in bank-depositor transactions. First, while depositors 
can withdraw their funds at any time, a repo lender commits to 
relinquishing its funds to the borrower for the entire term of the 
loan (its “exposure interval”), which can range anywhere from 
overnight to a year or more. As a result, in order to decide 
whether to roll over a repo, a lender must try to predict what 
other repo lenders and long-term lenders will do during its 
exposure interval. Second, depositors in a well-diversified pool are 
unlikely to withdraw their funds simultaneously because they are 
all experiencing a liquidity problem. On the other hand, repo 
lenders and those who provide financing to them—hedge funds, 
investment banks, bank holding companies, and other 
institutional investors—are more likely to experience liquidity 
and other financial problems at the same time, particularly in the 
midst of macroeconomic shocks or financial crises.144 As a result, 
repo borrowers are in a transitive risk relationship with those 
who provide funds to its repo lenders (the “repo-lender 
financiers”). If the repo-lender financiers withdraw their funding, 
repo borrowers will inherit the counterparty risk. Similarly, if 
repo borrowers fail to meet their obligations, the repo-lender 
financiers will inherit the transitive counterparty risk. 
 
 
 
3. The Transitive-Risk Problem and Repo Collateral 
Repo borrowers often use securities from their portfolios to 
secure their repos. Thus, a decline in the value of those securities 
can lead a repo lender to withdraw its funding, since it would be 
                                                
 144 See Lo, supra note 62, at 35 (discussing the risk related to correlated needs 
among those supplying and demanding liquidity). 
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an indication that the borrower’s overall portfolio may have lost 
value. Repo lenders will either request additional collateral or 
require that the borrower take a bigger haircut on the repo. In 
either case, the borrower will face a potential liquidity problem 
and will be forced to operate with a lower amount of leverage. 
This, in turn, may place it at a disadvantage in relation to other 
borrowers that can achieve a greater amount of leverage.145 
Moreover, since repo borrowers often use the same securities as 
collateral—e.g., the same type of mortgage-backed securities—a 
decline in the value of these securities can expose repo borrowers 
to transitive counterparty risk from other repo borrowers. In 
other words, even if a repo borrower is doing well financially, the 
fact that similarly situated borrowers are doing poorly may lead 
repo lenders to withdraw their funding.  
To see the nature of this transitive counterparty risk 
among repo borrowers, suppose that two borrowers are dealing 
with the same repo lender, using the same collateral, and that 
one of them defaults on its repo agreement. In order to salvage 
its investment, the lender would try to sell the collateral, which 
would put downward pressure on its value. This, in turn, would 
affect the “good” borrower’s ability to use that collateral when it 
tries to roll over its repo. The problem is further exacerbated if the 
“bad” borrower is shut out of the repo market and forced to sell 
more of that same type of securities in the open market. Finally, 
these sales may reveal a more accurate valuation of the securities 
in question, which may require both types of borrowers to write 
down the value of the asset on their balance sheets.  
This type of scenario was exactly what occurred in the 
repo markets beginning in August 2007, as lenders—worried 
about the declining value of the mortgage-backed securities 
that secured countless repo transactions—began to impose 
higher haircuts and require safer, more liquid securities, such 
as T-Bills.146 In fact, the haircut on some classes of asset-backed 
securities rose to 100 percent; in other words, they were no 
longer accepted as collateral.147  
                                                
 145 One of the reasons why shadow banks have a competitive advantage over 
traditional banks is that banking regulations limit the amount of leverage that a bank 
can undertake. See Lo, supra note 62, at 4.  
 146 See Gorton, supra note 65, at 35-36. 
 147 Id. 
2013] TRANSITIVE COUNTERPARTY RISK 1479 
D. Transitive-Risk Contracting and Securitization 
Securitization helps reduce the liquidity risks of lenders 
and provides them with funds to originate new loans.148 In a 
typical securitization transaction, one party (the originator) 
forms a special purpose vehicle (SPV), usually a trust, and sells 
it a pool of illiquid assets. In order to pay for the assets, the 
SPV sells securities that entitle the holders to receive part of 
the income stream produced by those assets. The securities are 
marketed to sophisticated investors, such as pension funds, 
hedge funds, mutual funds, and sovereign funds.149 
In order to reduce the risk that securitized assets pose 
to purchasers, the originator will either contract with a third 
party to provide a credit enhancement—that is, insurance—or 
structure the SPV in a way that will act as a form of internal 
insurance. Originators use two general techniques to provide 
this internal insurance. First, they may over-collateralize the 
SPV; that way, if some debtors default on their obligations, the 
additional collateral will cover part of the losses. Second, 
originators may use a capital structure for the SPV that 
stratifies the risk to investors.150 One common structure divides 
the securities into senior and junior tranches, so that the junior 
securities will be the first to absorb any losses. Moreover, 
prepayments made by debtors of the securitized assets will be 
distributed first to the senior security holders.151 
The types of assets used in these transactions include 
home and commercial mortgages, consumer loans, student 
loans, credit-card and automobile receivables, and other types of 
assets that will produce a stream of cash over time.152 
Traditionally, lenders held onto these assets and received the 
income stream as debtors repaid the principal and interest on 
their loans. But lenders also retained the risk that some of these 
payments would not materialize—that is, that some of the loans 
would not be repaid and would need to be written down.  
                                                
 148 See Brunnermeier, supra note 65, at 82 (describing use of securitization by 
lenders to sell illiquid assets in order to get funds that they can use to create additional 
loans or meet other liquidity needs).  
 149 See Gary B. Gorton & Nicholas S. Souleles, Special Purpose Vehicles and 
Securitization, in THE RISKS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 549, 560-65 (Mark Carey & 
René M. Stulz eds., 2007) (providing overview of securitization process). 
 150 See Gorton, supra note 65, at 19-20. 
 151 Id. 
 152 See Brunnermeier, supra note 65, at 78-79. 
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Securitization, however, allows a lender to sell the right 
to receive the future income stream from its loan portfolio to 
third parties. This has three principal advantages. First, the 
lender shifts the risk of owning the assets to buyers who, in 
theory, are better positioned to bear the risk. Second, the 
lender recognizes income immediately and can finance new 
loans, without having to raise additional short-term financing 
or, in the case of a commercial bank, grow its depositor base.153 
This, in turn, allows lenders to shift large portions of their 
business to off-balance-sheet transactions.154 Third, by shifting 
the risk of nonperforming loans to purchasers and transforming 
its loan portfolio into cash, a lender can reduce the risk of an 
assets-liabilities mismatch of the sort that plagued banks 
before the introduction of deposit insurance. 
It is helpful to examine the transitive-risk contracting 
relationships involved in mortgage-backed securities. If 
borrowers breach their residential mortgage loans with a bank, 
the counterparty risks of depositors increase; if those loans 
have been turned into mortgage-backed securities, the 
counterparty risks of the holders of those securities will 
increase. Since the originator will keep some of those mortgage-
backed securities to use as collateral for repo transactions, the 
repo purchasers holding those securities will inherit some of 
the increased counterparty risk that was first set in motion 
when the residential mortgage borrowers defaulted on their 
loans.  
 
 
 
Suppose that a lending institution or originator has 
built a loan portfolio and that the demand for that particular 
type of loan has subsided. The originator will either be required 
to keep the loans on its books or sell them at a discount. If it 
failed to anticipate this change in the market, then the 
                                                
 153 See Tirole, supra note 10, at 299 n.17. 
 154 Because banks are required to meet certain capitalization requirements, 
they will have an incentive to securitize loans in order to meet such requirements. This 
means that as banks face financial difficulties, they will have an incentive to securitize 
even more of these loans in order to meet the capitalization requirements. See OCC, 
supra note 118, at 4 (stating that by securitizing loans, banks can remove assets from 
balance sheets in a manner that allows them to raise more funds on on-balance sheet 
transactions). 
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originator may face a liquidity problem. Indeed, if it was 
depending on the proceeds from that sale to meet its 
repurchase obligation under the repo contract and defaults, 
then the repo lender will keep the collateral and sell it. But the 
transitive counterparty risk will also flow in the opposite 
direction. Defaults by the originator can lead repo lenders to 
curb their lending which in turn may lead to higher interest 
rates on mortgages, and a reduction in the demand for home 
purchases. The transitive-risk contracting model again 
captures a transitive-counterparty risk feedback loop; it is a 
loop that can fuel asset bubbles in good times and lead to sharp 
retrenchments when the bubble bursts. 
It is helpful to examine the incentives of loan 
originators to package loans strategically, thereby exacerbating 
the transitive risk problem. Suppose that an originator holding 
a loan portfolio categorizes its loans into three types: good, 
neutral, and bad. The originator knows it can sell the good 
loans and the neutral loans (but only if they are combined with 
some good loans). If it believes that it will have access to good 
loans in the future, it may decide to sell the good loans first, 
since they will provide the highest return. It will then use the 
funds from the sale to buy additional loans, and it will combine 
the good loans with the neutral ones. As long as a sufficient 
supply of good loans remains, the originator will continue to 
securitize. But, if the originator senses that the supply of good 
loans is diminishing, it will begin adding some neutral loans 
into the mix. Doing so, however, will yield a lower return and 
make it more difficult to bid for good loans that are in short 
supply and thus more expensive. At some point, the originator 
will be left with only bad and neutral loans. Left with few 
options, it will be tempted to package and sell them off, since 
this will give it an option value; it will be able to delay its 
financial reckoning, in the hopes that things will get better. 
But, over time, ratings agencies will prevent the originator 
from pursuing this strategy. It will become common knowledge 
that the market is in trouble and that outstanding asset-
backed securities are worth less than thought. By this point, 
the originator will hold a portfolio of relatively bad loans that 
cannot be packaged and sold.  
E. Liquidity and Transitive Counterparty Relationships 
Financial institutions are linked through a number of 
contractual transactions involving derivative securities, such as 
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interest rate swaps, exchange rate derivatives, mortgage-backed 
securities, and a number of other types of exotic financial 
instruments.155 Counterparties must remain solvent in order to 
perform their end of the bargain at the allotted time. A failure by 
one of these counterparties can lead to a default, which may 
require the promisee to readjust its securities portfolio or sell 
assets to meet the obligations that would have been covered by 
the counterparty. The next section will examine other transitive 
counterparty risks involving complex derivatives. This section will 
focus on how transitive contracting relationships can lead to the 
transfer of liquidity risks across institutions.  
One institution’s failure can cause liquidity problems for 
other institutions, and this systemic liquidity problem can cause 
financial markets to freeze up. Financial institutions often act 
both as borrowers and lenders, making a profit on the difference 
between what they have to pay to borrow funds and what they 
charge for their borrowers. When systemically important 
institutions fail, they will no longer be able to lend or borrow 
funds, a transitive counterparty risk that is transmitted to other 
institutions, even if they did not transact regularly with the 
failing institutions. In other words, when institutions fail, other 
institutions may reason that both their lenders and borrowers 
may enter into fewer transactions with them. This will in turn 
affect their cash flows both on the funding and supply sides. 
Fearing a liquidity crunch, institutions therefore will have an 
incentive to protect themselves by hoarding liquid assets—that is, 
by not lending. If they are afraid that other institutions will start 
selling securities from their portfolio, they will have an incentive 
to sell those securities first, which may lead to a fire-sale.156 
Moreover, a decision to sell a particular security will send a signal 
to the market about the value of the seller’s security portfolio. 
Given the adverse selection problem,157 it is more likely that bad 
                                                
 155 See Rochet & Tirole, supra note 135, at 733 (describing transactional 
interconnections, particularly through over-the-counter traded derivatives). 
 156 See Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Bank of England, Speech: Rethinking 
the Financial Network (Apr. 2001), available at http://www.bis.org/review/r090505e.pdf 
(describing dynamic in which financial institutions with risky assets engaged in 
liquidity hoarding and fire-sale of assets, and analogizing their response to the common 
reaction of people to outbreak of epidemic). 
 157 See Guillermo Calvo, Capital Market Contagion and Recession: An 
Explanation of the Russian Virus, in WANTED: WORLD FINANCIAL STABILITY 49, 50-51 
(Eduardo Fernandez-Arias & Ricardo Hausmann eds., 2000) (arguing that during a 
financial crisis buyers will face a market for “lemons” problem, in which they will 
require discounts due to uncertainty about the assets’ value; when liquidity is needed 
quickly, the affected institutions will have to sell their best assets first in a fire-sale).  
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financial institutions will sell the better assets first in order to 
send a deceptive signal to the market: that they are in a better 
financial position than they really are.158 This will lead good 
institutions to also sell their better assets first. If the liquidity 
problems persist, the bad institutions will fail, and the good ones 
will be left with securities portfolios containing poorly performing 
securities. We can refer to this phenomenon as the “toxic-asset-
transitive risk” dynamic.  
To see its full implications, suppose that a financial 
institution has three types of assets: those at each extreme of 
the good-to-bad spectrum, which can be easily identified as 
such by a buyer, and those that are too complex or otherwise 
too difficult to put into either category. The institution will be 
unable to sell the bad assets unless it offers a steep discount, 
but that would not yield enough cash to confront its pressing 
liquidity problem. Moreover, the assets that are difficult to 
categorize may require more time and due diligence to properly 
value, but given the time constraints, the institution will have 
an incentive to sell its most valuable assets first. The fact that 
the institution is selling large amounts of good assets at the 
same time may lead some market participants to conclude that 
they are not good after all. And buyers will know that they 
have a bargaining advantage, in light of the time constraint 
faced by sellers during a liquidity crunch. Accordingly, potential 
buyers will have incentive to delay in order to exacerbate the 
problem and increase their bargaining advantage.  
F. Transitive-Risk Contracting and Complex Derivatives 
The customers of modern financial intermediaries often 
enter into very complex transactions with both intermediaries 
and third parties. In doing so, they may rely on other 
intermediaries such as rating agencies.159 As these 
interconnections between parties increase in number and 
complexity, the risks to all parties involved become harder to 
understand and manage. This risk management problem is 
exacerbated by the competition among intermediaries to 
introduce financial products to exploit new markets. This, in turn, 
                                                
 158 For a discussion of the use of deceptive signaling, see Manuel A. Utset, 
Fraudulent Corporate Signals: Conduct as Securities Fraud, 54 B. C. L. REV. 645 (2013). 
 159 See Patrick Bolton, Xavier Freixas & Joel Shapiro, The Credit Rating 
Game, 67 J. FIN. 85, 108-09 (2012) (summarizing literature on how issuers shop for 
credit agencies in order to get favorable ratings and “exploit trusting investors”). 
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leads to the introduction of increasingly specialized and complex 
financial products, which are created on the fly by making slight 
changes to previous securities. As a result, these new financial 
products are usually sold to customers and “tested” 
simultaneously.160 Untested and poorly understood investments 
can quickly threaten the reliability of underlining risk 
management systems. If these systems are not updated in a 
timely fashion, they may give managers a false sense of security 
and lead them to enter into transactions they would have avoided 
had they known about the true extent of the existing risk.  
These securities are often created by combining two or 
more simpler contracts—or sets of promises—into a more 
complex one, which is more difficult to understand and value.161 
To deal with the valuation problem, parties use financial 
models that are themselves highly complex and difficult to 
verify—both ex ante and ex post—whether they are working 
correctly.162 For example, suppose a financial manager has 
identified a business problem, such as hedging a portfolio of 
securities, managing foreign currency risks, or meeting 
regulatory capitalization requirements. She will then choose an 
appropriate model to reduce the problem’s overall complexity 
and formulate a solution.163 The reliability of this solution will 
depend on the robustness of the model’s assumptions.  
In order to test the reliability and robustness of financial 
models, financial firms turn to “quantitative experts” who use 
computer simulations to predict how the models will play out in 
the real world. One important part of this exercise is to create 
                                                
 160 One reason why investment banks may rush to market new financial 
products is that once the products becomes public, other investment banks can copy 
them and sell them to their own clients. Unlike standard innovations, getting effective 
intellectual property protection of financial innovations is much more difficult. As a 
result, the first investment bank to reach the market with a new product will be able to 
acquire some market share and reputational capital before others copy its innovation. 
See FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND RISK SHARING 50-55 
(1994). It is possible to get patent protection on some types of financial innovations. See 
State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(allowing patents on financial innovation to consolidate information flow among group of 
mutual funds), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
 161 See Merton, supra note 84, at 341 (describing aggregation of contracts to 
form complex derivatives with new patterns of cash flows). 
 162 Firms, financial intermediaries, and regulators use financial models to 
make sense of the complex, real-world environment in which financial decisions are 
made and played out. See HO & LEE, supra note 4, at 8-9, 546-48 (describing use of 
models to value securities, formulate trading strategies, and evaluate risk of trading 
decisions in financial engineering, and in evaluating regulated financial companies). 
 163 See HO & LEE, supra note 4, at 8 (stating that models are developed to 
solve specific financial problems).  
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“stress tests,” in which a model’s standard assumptions are 
replaced with ones involving extreme scenarios. In theory, 
models that are not sufficiently robust to pass the stress test 
will be replaced with better ones. But “better” models often 
require a greater number of assumptions to better reflect real-
world environments, which in turn increase the model’s 
complexity. In the end, financial firms will be required to make 
a number of tradeoffs, any of which increases the risk that they 
will enter into a transaction with an incorrect understanding of 
the myriad transitive-risk contractual relationships involved 
and how to value and revalue them over time.  
CONCLUSION 
This article develops a new theory of financial contracts 
and the interconnectedness of financial institutions. The theory 
describes the role played by transitive-risk contractual 
relationships where multiple parties are tied to each other, 
directly or indirectly, through a series of interconnected contracts 
(contracts within a contractual chain). Transitive-risk contracting 
meshes well with our understanding of the factors that caused the 
Great Recession and thus led to the adoption of the Dodd-Frank 
Act. The Act requires financial regulators to adopt rules to reduce 
the risk of future financial crises due to the interconnectedness of 
financial institutions and the proliferation of complex financial 
contracts whose true risk remains hidden from the parties to the 
contract, other actors affected by those contracts, and financial 
regulators. The transitive-risk contracting model provides 
regulators with a way to identify problematic interconnections 
between financial institutions, and to identify financial contracts 
whose proliferation can lead to an increase in system-wide risk 
and the potential of a financial crisis and financial contagion. 
